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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
 
 
 
CAPITALIZATION OF GREEN SPACE AND WATER QUALITY INTO 
RESIDENTIAL HOUSING VALUES 
 
 
This thesis investigates how proximity to parks, historic district designations, and 
water quality are valued at residential housing prices. The first essay argues that the 
negative influences of parks and historic districts, if not noticed, could promote negative 
externalities and unincentivized investments. I find a negative impact on housing values 
for a close proximity to a park, suggesting disamenities in park features. When the 
boundary discontinuity and park amenities are considered, I find a positive valuation for a 
park. Overall, these results imply a mixed influence of parks on homeowners. From the 
historic district standpoint, I find a positive valuation of the local historic districts over the 
surrounding neighborhoods. The latter findings indicate that the benefits of locally 
designated areas outweigh the negative impacts. The second essay researches a probable 
lead risk in the water supply on the residential market. I argue strongly for the possibility 
of hidden-type information relative to lead in water supplies. I find that the influence of 
lead risk in their water supply is not statistically significant. The test for asymmetric 
information validates the expectation that homes in the relatively high lead-risk 
neighborhoods might not be informed of the level of lead-risk in their water supply.  
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             Information Asymmetries 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
It is easy to recognize environmental issues when the media relay news on climate change, 
smog cities, polluted water supplies, and cancer-inducing elements in our communities. 
The first essay, presented in Chapter 2, investigates how parks and historic districts 
influence the values of residential homes. Chapter 3 examines the impact a probable lead 
contamination level in the water supply has on residential properties. Empirically, I used 
hedonic valuation throughout this thesis to obtain parks, historic districts, and water lead 
risks' implicit values.  
The green space campaign aims to protect the environment, thus supporting other 
forms of life and caring for the environment. Parks are financed and expected to support 
health and to conserve green spaces for future generations. However, parks can face 
challenges or cause negative externalities, Walls (2009) and APA (2017). The environment 
is also maintained through historic districts. Historic districts are likely to boost 
environmental conservation, sustainability, reduce pollution, and support energy-efficient 
policies, Rocchi (2015). Nevertheless, designated areas could face challenges of radical 
change. Historic districts could adversely affect conservation goals and property 
investments. These designated areas could also displace low-income residents, Clark and 
Herrin (1997) and Fein (1985). In addition to investigating green space, this thesis 
evaluates the issue of lead poisoning risk. Lead poisoning in the United States has been an 
environmental and health case since the mid-1950s. Contemporarily, lead contaminations 
in water supplies became a trending issue because of the Flint, Michigan water crisis in 
2014. Some of the main challenges of lead contamination remained identifying sources of 
lead materials and financing water infrastructures to mitigate lead risks in water supplies.  
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To measure the values or influences of these environmental issues on homeowners, 
for which there exist no established markets, I subscribe to the hedonic model. Important 
to the environmental and natural resource discipline, the hedonic analysis is employed to 
measure environmental goods. Hedonic analysis connects environmental goods, services, 
or concerns as linked attributes to a market. By this association, an implicit value is 
revealed. For example, the hedonic approach has been used to estimate how people value 
environmental issues like air pollution, noise level, and water quality via the residential 
property market. The hedonic model, which links Chapter 2 and 3 in this thesis, combines 
structural, neighborhood, and environmental variables to measure parks and historic 
districts' implicit values, as well as lead risk levels in the water supply. Not only is the 
hedonic model a consolidating force for my essays, but also the dataset covering the 
residential market of Fayette County, Kentucky. The Property Valuation Administrator of 
Fayette County, Kentucky made available the dataset of over 90,000 observations. This 
dataset, from which I measured the influences of parks, historic districts, and water quality 
levels, date from 2000 to 2016. I merged the PVA data to other secondary information and 
my environmental variables of interest from Fayette County, Kentucky to support the 
application of the hedonic model. 
Chapter 2 concentrates on examining parks and historic districts hedonic values. I 
employed an ordinary least squares regression to evaluate the influences of parks and 
historic districts on residential homes. I also applied a boundary discontinuity procedure to 
estimates parks and historic districts’ values via properties that lie in the same geographical 
neighborhoods. The ordinary least squares technique finds a negative implicit value for 
parks. This result indicates that parks host amenities which might negatively affect their 
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use-value. The boundary discontinuity results find a positive value for parks, indicating a 
positive use-value. Applying the hedonic model to analyze designated areas, I also find 
that local historic districts have a positive influence on the residential market. This implies 
that local historic districts have benefits and exert a greater influence on the surrounding 
neighborhoods.  
In Chapter 3, I discussed the problem of identifying lead risk in the residential water 
supply. My argument is segmented into two phases. The first phase assessed the probable 
water lead risks impact on residential homes’ values. The second phase tested the argument 
that homeowners in the high lead risk water zones may have little information on their 
water supply, compared to the low lead risk neighborhoods. Results from the ordinary least 
squares and instrumental variable approaches show no statistical difference to avoid water 
lead risks. Results from the propensity score matching find that people will pay a higher 
price to live in a low-risk water neighborhood. The latter result might be susceptible to 
omitted variable bias. These results further reflect that homeowners care more about the 
home’s structural characteristics and neighborhoods’ income levels than lead risks. Results 
from the second phase show that the average growth rate for homes in the high lead risk 
areas is greater than the low-risk neighborhoods. The average growth rate is the appreciated 
price from the resales of residential homes. This growth rate results imply that home buyers 
in the high-risk areas might be less informed about lead risk. 
My essays contribute to the literature by investigating the combined implicit effects 
of park amenities and historical districts, assessing the hedonic value of a probable lead 
exposure risk in drinking water, and testing for the possibility of lead risk asymmetric 
information in the residential market. I identified potential gaps and provided 
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recommendations to support current policies addressing these environmental issues. I 
recommend that parks' authorities use surveys to detect and mitigate the negative parks 
externalities. Besides, I call on historic district authorities to adopt communications and 
actions which could combat gentrification and support societal, environmental, and 
economic integration. In the vein of lead risk, I suggest that water and related authorities 
should ensure that water-lead problems are fully disclosed during the sales of residential 
homes, in conjunction with the lead paint full-disclosure regulations. 
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CHAPTER TWO: HEDONIC VALUATION OF GREEN SPACE IN FAYETTE 
COUNTY, KENTUCKY: INVESTIGATING PARKS AND HISTORICAL 
DISTRICTS 
Parks are green spaces which might promote health, recreational benefits, and private 
investments. A historic designation can indicate high-quality craftsmanship with durable 
materials and an attractive aesthetic. I investigate the influences of parks and historic 
district designations on homeowners. Using data provided by the Property Valuation 
Administrator of Fayette County, Kentucky, I employ a hedonic analysis to investigate the 
implicit values of parks and historic districts. I find mixed valuations for parks and report 
a positive influence associated with historic districts. 
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I. Introduction 
Parks play a key role in the drive for green space and the accompanying environmental 
attributes. Parks, which are financed to bring recreation benefits and social life to 
communities, are valued for their amenities. To depict a financing picture for parks, 
Lexington government in Fayette County, Kentucky assigned $1,542,000 in funds and 
$2,955,000 in Bonds for the 2016/2017 Fiscal Year to the Parks and Recreation for 
maintenance and development projects. In view of designated areas, homeowners residing 
in historic districts may enjoy environmentally friendly homes, tax incentives, and 
investment benefits. To provide an investment picture for historic districts, homeowners 
residing in historic districts in the State of Kentucky had invested, on average, $123,537 in 
historic properties by 2015. These investments, to some extent, are tied to Federal, State, 
and local tax benefits, such as preservation tax deductions. Specifically, I ask the research 
question: How does proximity to a park and historical district designation affect residential 
housing values? I expect that parks and historic district designations would positively 
influence the values of residential homes.  
This study contributes to the green space or environmental valuation literature by 
investigating two environmental attributes that exist in the same spatial scope. Studies have 
independently measured the value of parks and historic districts using willingness to pay 
analyses. Livy and Klaiber (2010) examined the values of amenities in parks, as parks 
change over time. Although their results showed mixed valuation for parks, the authors 
argued that nearness to a park is not highly valued and ignoring heterogeneity in park 
amenities is not advisable. Klaiber and Phaneuf (2010), using a utility sorting model, show 
that the housing market, a component of location, structure, and time, is necessary to 
7 
 
analyze open space. Livy and Klaiber (2010) find that utility maximization of open space 
depends on the location and the open space type. In the realm of historic district literature, 
Clark and Herrin (1997) emphasized that historic preservation strategy is employed by 
cities’ authorities to revive declining metropolitan areas and support renewed interest in 
designated areas. Clark and Herrin evidently show that historic district put forth a net 
positive effect on the residential property. Coulson and Lahr’s (2005) findings showed a 
higher value for properties in historical designations: Local designations have a positive 
and significant effect, while national historic districts have a non-significant effect on 
residential properties. Regardless of studies showing the positive effects of historically 
designated areas, scholarships like Heudorfer (1975) and Gale (1991) find a neutral or 
negative influence of historic district on properties. Fein (1985) sees historic districts as a 
commitment to preserve city neighborhoods for the privileged, claiming a gentrification 
phenomenon.  
My study is theoretically underpinned by the hedonic framework. The hedonic 
model is built on the pioneering theories and assumptions of Lancaster (1966) and Rosen 
(1974). Lancaster argues that consumption activities produce a vector of characteristics and 
individuals will optimally choose the solution that maximizes their utilities for the 
characteristics. Rosen (1974) supports the hedonic theory by explaining that differentiated 
products consist of a vector of objective measurable characteristics. Hedonic prices show 
implicit prices of assigned characteristics, as reveal to consumers by sellers. Aligning the 
hedonic theory to this study, the value of residential homes depends not only on the 
structural characteristics but also on the neighborhood and environmental attributes. As a 
result, hedonic prices will implicitly show the values for parks and historic districts. The 
8 
 
dataset used in this study incorporates information on home sales transactions, house 
characteristics, and neighborhood and environmental attributes. My dataset for this essay 
consists of 64,727 observations. The dataset was built on the residential housing market in 
Fayette County, Kentucky and it covered a 17-year period, 2000 to 2016. Fayette County, 
Kentucky’s Property Valuation Administrator (PVA) is the main source of my data. 
Accumulating information from different data sources, I mapped and merged all data using 
the Quantum Geo-information system (QGIS) software. Hence, I regress the log of the sale 
price on the structural, neighborhood, and environmental attributes to accurately evaluate 
the impact of parks and historic districts on the residential market. Herein, I used a 
covariate approach for my identification strategy. The inclusion of covariates (time fixed 
effects, housing & neighborhood attributes, as well as school and park fixed effects) are 
presented in a stepwise approach. Results from the hedonic models steered the stage for 
the implications and discussions. 
The organization of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the 
background of the study; Section 3 reviews park and historic district studies; Section 4 and 
5 respectively describe the theoretical model and the data; Section 6 hosts the designs of 
my econometric model, and Section 7 reveals the empirical findings. The study is finalized 
in Section 8 and 9, where I discussed my findings and provide a conclusion. 
II. Background 
Fayette County, Kentucky provides a green space and urban-rural context that this study 
exploits to evaluate Fayette County, Kentucky provides a green space and urban-rural 
context that this study exploits to evaluate the use-value of environmental attributes, 
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namely park features, and historically designated areas. In Fayette County, Kentucky, 
green space is contextualized as a heritage to environmental amenities, including 
interwoven qualities of urban-rural landscapes, farmsteads, lands, parks, trees, and water 
networks. Green space in Fayette County, Kentucky has positive externalities that directly 
benefits tourism, businesses, and the public. Supported by Kentucky’s State statutes, there 
are Comprehensive plans that serve as guidelines to maintain green space and to enhance 
economic growth and land use management in Fayette County, Kentucky. Fayette County, 
Kentucky’s 2007 and 2013 Comprehensive plans project environmental and neighborhood 
goals that are built on the frameworks of protecting, promoting, and designing open space 
and green infrastructure, and monitoring and strategizing to reduce pollutions of air water, 
light, and noise. These Plans guide both sellers and buyers of residential, commercial, and 
industrial properties in Fayette County, Kentucky to acknowledge land preservation and to 
promote green infrastructures. Specifically, environmental goals in these plans drive 
sustainability in parks and designated districts. Fayette County, Kentucky consists of more 
than 100 parks and 17 historic districts. Parks in Fayette County, Kentucky are highly 
variable in types, sizes, recreational facilities, and provide support to communities’ 
livelihood activities. Local historical districts are dispersed throughout Fayette County, 
Kentucky. These historic neighborhoods also exhibit variability. Illustratively, historically 
designated areas in Fayette County, Kentucky can be found close to the central business 
district or within suburban neighborhoods. 
Parks and historic districts play a key role in green space campaigns. Ideally, parks 
are appreciated for the usefulness of their amenities. Nationwide, park types, for instance, 
community, neighborhood, and golf-course parks have associated positive externalities, 
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NRPA (2017). Community parks represent health and a diversified community space. 
Neighborhood parks contribute to recreation and physical activities. Golf-course parks are 
noted for their relaxing environment, green fields, rolling hills, streams and recreational 
activities; State-owned parks offer positive activities ranging from hiking and picnicking 
to wildlife habitat management and recreational use. In the same spirit of exhibiting 
positive externalities, there are benefits of establishing and living in local historic areas. 
Designated districts support environmentally friendly homes, counting energy efficient 
residents, enjoying socio-psychological benefits, and protecting residential investments, 
Rocchi (2015) and O'Donnell (1998). Historic districts encourage communities to retain 
and use their existing resources in an effort to contribute to the reduction of pollution, 
congestion, and landfill waste.  In the intentions of improving the environment, historic 
districts may allow communities to incorporate and exercise environmental stewardship 
and contribute to emergency management decisions, FEMA (2017). Homeowners within 
historic districts may qualify for tax incentives, as derived from the total value of expenses 
incurred when preserving the property.  
Despite the positive externalities associated with parks and historic districts, there 
exist problems that could counteract or negatively alter the importance of these green space 
amenities. Regarding parks, a community park might breed societal challenges such as 
gangs, drugs, gun violence and noise, APA (2017). Under-utilization and 
underperformances have raised critical concerns for neighborhood parks, Alliances (2017). 
Despite the benefits from golf course parks, there might be right of entry, admission fees, 
and an accompanying property tax. State-owned parks are afflicted with taxes, neglected 
maintenance, and increased wildfires, State Owned Reservations (2017). Regarding 
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historic districts, the nightmare of either gentrification or neglect investment is a problem 
which could hinder investments and positive influences in designated districts. Through 
gentrification, historic districts may only host residents of middle and upper-middle-class 
families, Clark and Herrin (1997) and Fein (1985). There are also potential consequences 
of high maintenance costs and building code regulations that may cause a prisoner’s 
dilemma-like interaction, wherein historic property owners are not motivated to invest in 
their property maintenance, Coulson and Lahr (2005).  
In spite of challenges that could be encountered or widened by parks and historic 
districts, I concentrate on the question: How does proximity to a park and historical district 
designation affect residential housing values? I hypothesize that parks and historic districts 
have positive influences on residential homeowners, because the locals who utilize parks’ 
amenities and live in historic districts might enjoy environmental benefits, as well as public 
and private investments. My objective of this green space research is to empirically assess 
the influences of parks and historic districts on residential properties’ values.  I used the 
residential market to establish the measure of influence and determine the implicit use-
values for parks and historic districts. Use-value reflects utilities and externalities 
associated with environmental goods or issues.  
The massive support toward parks, including projects for development and 
infrastructure maintenance, is one of the forces backing the study's motivation. Funds for 
parks are disbursed on playgrounds, outdoor fitness facilities, buildings, and beautification 
of gardens. In the context of Fayette County, Kentucky, financing parks bring recreational 
and event benefits, such as afterschool activities, arts and sports, camps, rental facilities, 
and tourism to residents, Park and Recreation (2017). During 2016/2017 Fiscal Year, 
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Fayette County, Kentucky government allocated $1,542,000 in funds to the county’s Parks 
and Recreation for maintenance and replacement of outdated parks equipment. Also, the 
2017 Fiscal Year designates $2,955,000 in Bond for major repairs and improvements of 
parks. These funds support projects such as the construction of amphitheaters and aquatic 
centers in existing parks, the designs of proposed parks, and the renovation of playgrounds.  
My expectation for historic district valuation is motivated by an investment factor. 
There are approximately 85,014 historic places listed, with over 13,594 historic districts in 
the United States. The 2016 Fiscal Year Annual Report of the Federal Tax Incentives for 
Rehabilitating Historical Districts reported an aggregate investment of 1,039 certified 
completed projects valued at $5.85 billion. 57% of these completed projects invested in 
private housing. For example, by 2015, 832 historic rehabilitation projects were reviewed 
in Kentucky through the Historic Preservation Tax Credit program. In monetary value, 
private investments contributed $647,260,922 to historic rehabilitation. On average, 
residential homeowners in the State of Kentucky had invested $123,537 in historic 
properties. Kentucky Heritage Council consolidates with the Governor and the 
Preservation Officer to administer Kentucky Preservation Historic Tax Credit program. 
III. Literature Review 
Hedonic analysis has been instrumental to the discipline of environmental economics, 
assisting the discipline to value environmental goods. Ridker and Henning (1967) first used 
the hedonic approach to calculate the significance of air pollution sulfation and its 
actionable effects on changing property values. Thereafter, environmental studies have 
applied the hedonic analysis to research noise level, Bjorner et al. (1992), woodland cover, 
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Garrod and Willis (1992), and water quality, Leggett and Bockstael (2000), Rubinfeld 
(1978), and Brookshire et al. (1981). I contribute to the hedonic literature by investigating 
the combined implicit effects of park amenities and historical districts on property values. 
A. Parks Hedonic Review 
Livy and Klaiber (2010) scrutinized park amenity values, as parks change over time.  The 
authors re-echoed the unexpected findings that are sometimes associated with park 
amenities: Residential homeowners will offer a discount to live near a park. Livy and 
Klaiber warned that if a research is not robust, the research might not carefully observe the 
bundling hypothesis of parks. Livy and Klaiber argued that, when evaluating park as an 
environmental good, the aggregate result of proximity to a park is a bundle of positive and 
negative attributes. Livy and Klaiber (2010) contribute to the literature by way of their 
investigation which focused on the non-significant statistical results associated with studies 
on parks, the effects of heterogeneity in park amenities, and the consistency of depreciated 
values of park amenities over time. I agree with Livy and Klaiber on the notion that each 
park and its fulfilling amenities require different upkeep attention and that each park is 
viewed and valued distinctly through the public eyes. Like many traditional hedonic 
studies, their general model features the first stage hedonic price of a semi-log functional 
form. Livy and Klaiber (2010) assumptions hold that the hedonic model envelopes a vector 
of structural characteristics, neighborhood attributes, local park amenities, and time. Using 
data from the Maryland Property View and Baltimore County Park Renovation between 
2000 and 2007, Livy and Klaiber applied fixed effects parsimonious models. Their specific 
model controlled for housing characteristics, neighborhood attributes, parks’ facilities 
renovated or maintained at a fixed location, and the depreciation effect through time. 
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Results from the Census Tract, Block group, and property fixed effect models, as 
constructed by Livy and Klaiber (2010), show that nearness to a park is not highly valued 
and ignoring heterogeneity in park amenities is not advisable. Their findings report that 
playground and field renovation have positive and significant estimates, while courts and 
lighting renovation have negative positive and significant estimates. Park trails did not 
yield a statistically significant result. Livy and Klaiber attributed the negative significant 
coefficients to noise, light pollution, increased usage of amenities, and increased night-
time activities. Contrariwise, Livy and Klaiber credited the positive and significant 
coefficients to safer infrastructures, increased desirability by families, and park’s green 
space.  
Valuing park allows one to quickly realize the non-market nature of environmental 
goods, including green and open spaces. The solution to this probing technique is structured 
in an existing nearby market. The residential market, depicting models of household 
location choice, is foundational for measuring the willingness to pay for environmental 
goods, Kuminoff and Pope (2010). Klaiber and Phaneuf (2010) use a utility sorting model 
to show that the housing market, a component of location, structure, and time, is necessary 
to analyze open space. A focusing element for consistently and accurately identifying the 
willingness to pay for park amenities is to control for heterogeneity. Although their study 
is skewed to policy interventions and open space conversation, Klaiber and Smith (2013) 
contribute to the literature by emphasizing on the identification of heterogeneity in 
amenities. Accounting for amenities’ heterogeneities might explain the locational decision 
trade-offs that households make to experience optimal utilization. Klaiber and Phaneuf 
(2010) conceptual sorting model is built on the basic random utility model. That is, each 
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household decides to maximize its utility by the house type, spatial location, time, and other 
neighborhood and observable attributes. Households classify and choose among their local 
jurisdictions to get the desired public good. They employed a two-stage empirical strategy 
to recover household heterogeneity and price coefficient. In the context of the Twin Cities 
of Minnesota (i.e., the Seven-County area) the data presents a case of variability in the 
types of open space. With the aggregate information constructed on the subsets of a 
household choice set, residential transaction, land use, and Census data from 1990 and 
2000, the data included property values and characteristics, landscape amenities, and the 
socioeconomic characteristics of households. The authors matched and mapped spatially 
explicit landscape data to a real estate transaction. Their conclusive results, in part, 
prioritize the analysis of heterogeneity for open space type and preferences. Their findings 
show that utility maximization of open space decisively depends on location and type.  
The hedonic model and willingness to pay estimators are seriously plagued with 
endogeneity issues. The hedonic functional forms might either accurately or inaccurately 
estimate the willingness to pay for environmental attributes. With the intention of choosing 
the right functional model for environmental inference, Kuminoff et al. (2010) questioned 
which hedonic functional forms are appropriate to evaluate the economic effect of policies 
which target local public goods, environmental services, and urban amenities. Motivated 
by Cropper et al. (1988), Kuminoff et al. (2010) investigated misspecification caused by 
omitted variable bias in the hedonic model. The challenge of omitted variable bias exists 
when factors that are important to explain the price, neighborhood characteristics, and 
environmental variables, such as park features, and designated characteristics, are not 
observed in the function.  This endogeneity issue might lead to an inaccurate estimate of 
16 
 
economic values. Kuminoff et al. (2010) constructed a Monte Carlo experiment to probe 
the accuracy of hedonic functional forms in the quest to mitigate the problem of omitted 
variable bias. Their Monte Carlo analysis included six functional forms, namely linear, 
semi-log, double-log, quadratic, linear Box-Cox, and quadratic Box-Cox. The 
characteristic vectors, as used by Kuminoff et al. (2010), encompassed the structural 
housing attributes, idiosyncratic income, locational preferences, and proximity to open 
space. They calibrated the model to a data of 104,000 single family housing sales in Wake 
County, North Carolina between 1992 and 2000. Their findings advised studies to 
incorporate spatial fixed effects to mitigate the danger of omitted variable bias. Unlike 
previous findings, their results show that with the spatial fixed effect control, a flexible 
specification like the quadratic Box-Cox outperforms the parsimonious linear, semi-linear, 
and double log functional forms. Kuminoff et al. (2010)’s work is distinct to the hedonic 
literature by virtue of its advice that studies should carefully think about the hedonic 
specifications, account for endogeneity, and encourage the usage of fixed spatial effect, 
time dummy, and quasi-experiment models. 
B. Historic District in the Hedonic Literature 
The body of literature covering historic district influence on property valuation has found 
mixed evidence of positive and negative effects. Clark and Herrin (1997) argued that 
historic preservation is a tactful strategy employed by cities’ authorities to revive declining 
metropolitan areas and support renewed interest in a designated area. Hence, historic 
districts host residents of middle and upper-middle-class families (gentrification) and 
preserve a municipality’s tax benefits by encouraging renovation of the residential and 
commercial properties. The authors use the hedonic price theory on a sample of residential 
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properties in Sacramento, California to investigate whether positive externalities from a 
historic preservation designation outweigh the potential negative impacts of a cumbersome 
set of rules imposed by authorities. Living in a historically preserved district in the United 
States comes with straight regulations of making an alteration to properties to promote 
health, safety, and welfare. Clark and Herrin also warned that preservation plans and 
regulations, which require homeowners to improve deteriorating properties, may not be 
sufficient to incentivize the property upkeep. As a result, the property value will decrease 
due to strict rules. The higher cost of renovation could also overwhelm the positive upkeep 
campaign in historic districts. Fitting the data to 20 historic districts, Clark and Herrin 
(1997) used a single stage hedonic price model, which viewed housing as a differentiated 
bundle of structural and neighborhood characteristics. Clark & Herrin assumed information 
symmetries, zero transaction cost, and a continuous offering of attributes. Their model 
specified the structural, neighborhood, year, and historic preservation influences on home 
price through a semi-log functional form to avoid misspecification biases. Clark and Herrin 
included a control through the interactions of the historic district dummy with the age of 
the house, and neighborhoods that are in a close proximity to the historic district. The latter 
covariate may explain the spillover effect of a historic district on nearby properties. 
Applying the white test correction technique, Clark and Herrin's findings show that historic 
district put forth a net positive effect on the residential property; a historic district increases 
the average home sale price by 25 percent. Notwithstanding, they also conclude that the 
success of the historic district is strongly predicted by the characteristics of the 
neighborhood. 
18 
 
Leichenko et al. (2000) also agreed that designated areas are used as instruments to 
rejuvenate or to halt neighborhoods deterioration. Leichenko et al. questioned the mixed 
results of the effect of designated areas on property values: Evidence of positive or 
detracting values. The positive effects of historic districts contain insurance for a better 
neighborhood quality and a positive spillover effect for neighboring areas. The value 
detracting aspects include a restriction on alteration and demolition, as well as expensive 
maintenance. These authors contribute to the literature by examining the effects of historic 
districts on property values across a larger set of cities, a limitation of previous studies. 
Their appraisal data contained information from nine cities (Abilene, Dallas, Fort Worth, 
Grapevine, Laredo, Lubbock, San Antonio, Nacogdoches, and San Marcos), hosting over 
6,000 historic properties. Leichenko et al. designed selection criteria for comparable and 
different types of historic districts. Their modeling approach estimated house price as a 
function of property characteristics, neighborhood location, and historic status. Like Clark 
and Herrin (1997), Leichenko et al. (2000) used a semi-log hedonic specification form of 
the natural log of price and included a control of the interaction of the historic district with 
year built to avoid upward bias. Mainly, their results suggested that historic district 
generally has a positive impact on property values, and historic area is associated with 
average property value increases ranging between five (5) and twenty percent (20) of the 
total property value. Their results also indicated that historic district, whether national, state 
or local, tend to have a mixed effect on housing values.  
The formation and support of designated districts is a prevalent tool to preserve 
cultural heritage through external stimuli such as the 20% national tax credit program. 
Coulson and Lahr (2005), influence this paper via their emphasis on the potential 
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ramifications of historic districts. Coulson and Lahr stressed on the negative effects that 
might deter the interest, influence, and investment in a historic district. Constraints of living 
in a designated district include the types of refurbishment and rehabilitation that can be 
undertaken, upkeep maintenance, and building code regulations. The authors framed the 
constraint scenario into a prisoner’s dilemma-like interaction, wherein property owners 
aren’t incentivized to invest in their property maintenance. Over time, neighbors may copy 
the low-level investment strategy, thus causing a downward spiral of quality on housing 
stock in the district. As a result, the neighborhood is made worse-off through low 
investment. Covering the period 1998 to 2002 and sourced through Memphis Landmarks 
Commissions, Coulson and Lahr’s (2005) data included 5,889 observations from historic 
districts and historic conservation zones. Results from a series of models show that 
historical designations add 12.6 percent to the property appreciation process. Further 
evidence shows that local designations have a positive and significant effect, while results 
belonging to national historic districts were not statistically significant. Another interesting 
finding by Coulson and Lahr, segmenting historic district into old and new properties, show 
that new properties benefit more than older properties in a historic district.  
Other studies covering designated areas have solely debated that historic districts, 
though with plans to mitigate neighborhood negative externalities, are believed to depress 
property values. In this light, difference-in-difference studies report neutral or negative 
effects on property values by designated districts, Heudorfer (1975), New York Landmarks 
Conservancy (1977), Samuels (1981), and Gale (1991). Fein (1985) perceived historic 
district as a commitment to preserve city neighborhoods for the privileged. The socio-
judiciary notes, published in the New York University Law Review, stressed that historic 
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district has the tendency to displace or exclude low-income and minority residents from 
urban neighborhoods; a gentrification phenomenon. 
IV. The Conceptual Hedonic Model 
The theoretical framework in this essay is underpinned by the hedonic model. The hedonic 
model is built on the pioneering theories and assumptions of Lancaster (1966) and Rosen 
(1974). A central assumption instantiated by these theorists is the characteristics rationale. 
Lancaster (1966) consumer theory reflects that goods are goods in a substitution 
determinate world and inputs’ output is a collection of characteristics. Lancaster argued 
that goods hold characteristics and characteristics give rise to utility; goods have more 
characteristics, and combined goods possess varying utilities than separate goods. In 
addition to these arguments, Lancaster (1966) modeled consumer behavior on three basic 
assumptions. First, Lancaster assumes individual good or a collection of goods is a 
consumption activity which is associated with the level of activity. It is also assumed that 
the level of activities associated with a consumer good is linear, objective, and carry 
intrinsic properties in relation to technology. The second assumption present that 
consumption activities produce a vector of characteristics in a linear relationship. And 
lastly, individual possess an ordinal utility function on characteristics and will optimally 
choose the solution that maximizes his utility for the characteristics. 
Fk(z, x) = 0, k = 1…m        (1) 
The model in Equation 1 maintains a no one-to-one relationship between the activity 
vector, indexed by k, and the collections of characteristics z and x that available to the 
consumers.  
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Rosen (1974) strongly supports the hedonic theory through his explanation that 
differentiated products consist of a vector of objective measurable characteristics. In his 
argument, an observed product price and the tied characteristics signify the hedonic price. 
One of the main assumptions of Rosen’s implicit prices is market equilibrium. In the 
consumer domain, the price that consumers will be willing to pay for a good, the 
consumption decision, indicates utility maximization subject to a nonlinear budget 
constraint. Choosing a basket of goods to maximize satisfaction, consumers will purchase 
a product that has a unique combination of characteristics to achieve optimal utility.  
P(z) = U(x, z1,…zn; α, y)            (2) 
Equation 2 sums the consumption decision into the consumer bid function, where z is the 
product characteristics, x is all other goods consumed, y is constraint income, and α is the 
taste parameter that varies with each consumer. Regarding the production decision, each 
producer, acting independently, consider the number of units to produce and the package 
of specific characteristics to assemble in a locational space. 
P(z) = C(M, z1,…zn; ẞ)            (3) 
As projected in Equation 3, producers want to maximize profit by choosing the 
optimal cost of the number of units to produce M and the specific characteristics to include, 
z. These are based on the factor prices and other production parameters, ẞ. So, the market 
equilibrium combines buyers and seller’s goals through a hedonic price function. Goods 
have stated prices, valued by sellers, and goods are associated with a fixed characteristic 
vector, valued by consumers. Thus, setting the stage for the implicit price function, the 
hedonic function. 
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P(z) = p(z1,…zn)            (4) 
Analyzing the theories of Lancaster (1966) and Rosen (1974) in the application of 
this study, the residential market in Fayette County, Kentucky is a bundle of defined 
characteristics. Fayette County, Kentucky’s housing market reflects characteristics that are 
orderly valued indirectly in different relative proportions. Recall, the residential market 
serves as a medium to measure the implicit use-value of environmental goods. Homes 
package characteristics like structural, neighborhood, environmental, and time attributes. 
Because households’ attractions in Fayette County, Kentucky are influenced by these 
characteristics, benefits from parks and historic districts in the county might be captured 
by each household. 
Ui = (P, H, N, E, T, ε)            (5) 
In Equation 5, utilities enjoyed by household i in Fayette County, Kentucky encompass the 
market clearing price of the home P, housing characteristics H, neighborhood and 
environmental attributes N and E, macro-fiscal time reflected in T, and unobservables ε. 
Note that, the utility function accounts for heterogeneity in the preferential valuation of 
homes, such as choosing a to live in a historic district or close to a park. The varying 
characteristics of parks, such as hosting a trail or community center, and if a historic district 
is in a central business district or on the rural side of Fayette County, Kentucky, might 
contain different utilities, thus giving rise to different preferences. 
In the market equilibrium situation, homeowners in the Fayette County, Kentucky 
have a bid function that manifests their willingness to accept the household expenditures 
and to pay for a given utility at a relative budget. Separately, home sellers in Fayette 
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County, Kentucky are sensitive to their locational decision and the package of 
characteristics assembled. Revealed by the household market clearing price, the hedonic 
price function implicitly displays the value of characteristics. 
P = f (H1,…,Hm; T1,…,Tn,  N1,…,Nm; E1,…,Ep, ε)        (6) 
The expression of attributes like H1,…, Hm and E1,…, Ep accounts for the number of 
characteristics associated with each attribute vector. This also allows for heterogeneous 
preferences, Klaiber and Phaneuf (2010).   
Summed up, the hedonic theory explains that a commodity is a wrapped bundle of 
characteristics. The value of residential homes depends not only on the structural 
characteristics of the home but also on the neighborhood and environmental attributes. The 
hedonic price function is traditionally linear, or it may be nonlinear, so that implicit prices 
can vary with the level of characteristics, Hanley et al. (2007). The hedonic theory assumes 
information symmetries, low transaction cost, unlimited attributes, and an unsegmented 
market. These assumptions are potential empirical concerns for the hedonic model. Even 
accounting for these assumptions, the hedonic model is susceptible to empirical pitfalls, 
including omitted variable bias, multicollinearity, choice of functional form, market 
segmentation, expected versus actual characteristics, and altitude to risks. Omitted variable 
bias causes inaccurate estimates. The choice of functional form influences the value of the 
implicit prices. Multicollinearity presents the disadvantage of entangled implicit prices, 
Hanley et al. (2007). Consequently, the appropriate hedonic models must consider these 
empirical caveats and control for these econometric challenges. 
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V. Data 
Based on the hedonic model designed by this paper, the analysis requires data on home 
sale transactions, house characteristics, neighborhood and environmental attributes, the 
economic times, and financial strength of homes in Fayette Kentucky. My dataset consists 
of 64,727 observations which derive from the residential housing market in Fayette, 
Kentucky. The dataset covers a 17-year period, 2000 to 2016 and accumulates information 
from different sources, including Fayette County, Kentucky’s Lexington-Urban 
government, and the US Census Bureau. I mapped and merged the data from all sources 
using Quantum Geo-Information System (QGIS) techniques. The data-merging Geo-
spatially corresponds to Kentucky Coordinate Reference System: EPSG 102679, NAD 
1983 State Plane. 
A. Housing Characteristics and Time Data 
Housing characteristics represent the category of structural variables. As shown in Figure 
2.1, a dominant portion of Fayette County. Kentucky’s residential home transactions, over 
the 17-year period (2000 to 2016), occurred in the Central South-west region of the county. 
This residential transaction data is accredited to and provided by the Fayette County, 
Kentucky’s Property Valuation Administrator (PVA). The PVA, an agent of the Kentucky 
government, collects property data by its Ad valorem authority and taxation role. Through 
these duties, the PVA stores information on all personal properties, including residential 
homes. In addition to its data collection responsibilities, the PVA tracks ownership changes 
and updates building characteristics. Although over 90,000 observed transactions were 
provided in this study, the precise GIS merging and data cleaning processes finalize the 
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observations to 64,727 transactions. For instance, I dropped all residential sales below 
$16,000 real price to avoid outliers, unrealistic observations, and potential data errors. 
16,000 was chosen because more than 100 hedonic studies used $16,000 as the minimum 
value for housing price, Kuminoff et al. (2010). The residential data in this study capture 
housing characteristics and time factors, including revealed sale transactions, house age in 
linear form, square feet of the building, fixed and half bathrooms, number of floors, garage 
type, and property acreage. Time data are represented by the sale's month and year. See 
Table 2.1. 
The revealed sale price is adjusted to 2016 real price (2016 CPI = 240.007). Over 
the study period, the data reveal that homes were sold on average for $220,070. The average 
home age was 34 years old. The data capture homes built in the 19th century, as early as 
1810, to the final year of the study period, 2016. The average square footage of homes is 
1,842 linear feet; the average story of homes is about 1.4 units tall; the average number of 
fixed bathrooms is 2 units; the average number of half bathroom is a half unit, and the 
average property acreage is 0.22 acres. 64% of homes have attached garage, followed by 
homes with detached and no garage, respectively at about 15% and 14%. In terms of the 
month factor, most of the sales occur proportionally in the months of June, July, August, 
May, and August. Sales of residential properties are the lowest in the months of January, 
February, and December. From the sale’s year categorical analysis, about 26% of 
residential transactions occurred during the peak years of 2004 (at 9%), 2005 (at 9%), and 
2003 (at 8%). Year 2010 (at 3%), 2011 (at 3%), and 2012 (at 4%) encountered the lowest 
sales frequencies in the data. This paper expects that the structural variables of square 
footage, story, fixed and half bathrooms, property acreage, and attached garage will 
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positively increase the average home price. On the other hand, I expect that older homes 
and slow sale months and years will adversely affect the house price, a negative 
relationship. 
B. Neighborhood Attributes Data 
The neighborhood characteristics data, which are integrated to explain community forces 
and socioeconomic patterns, are merged with the County map and residential data through 
the QGIS package. The neighborhood data were collected from multiple sources, including 
the US Census Bureau and Lexington Fayette-Urban County Government (Lexington 
opened data portal). Information on the median household income at the Census Tract level 
is provided by Social Explorer, a database which provides demographic data for the United 
States. Note: the original source of the median household income is attributed to the US 
Census Bureau and American Community Survey. Because willingness to pay for a utility 
is subject to income constraint, the median household income is a proxy that represents the 
household income in adjusted inflation dollars. Median household incomes are calibrated 
to year-2000 adjusted price for incomes between 2000 and 2009, and to year-2010 for 
incomes between 2010 and 2016. The data analysis shows that the average median 
household income was $56,667 for Fayette County, Kentucky, as linked to the study 
period. 
14 Zone Improvement Plan (ZIP) coded areas, which also serves as a proxy for 
neighborhood influences on households, are included in the study. Although ZIP-code 
areas are primarily used in an effective mailing system, a ZIP area might control for aspects 
such as the socioeconomic pattern, population, and crime rates that are associated with 
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residential households. The proximity of a home within a 0.096-km radius of a water 
network is constructed to reflect residential property's waterfront amenities. My waterfront 
control does not separately describe if the water network is a branch, creek, tributary, run, 
or fork. Through the established radius, the data show that 92% of the residential sales may 
not have access to waterfront amenities, while 8% of homes might enjoy the benefit of 
waterfront amenities. I find that waterfront properties sell above the average real price than 
non-waterfront properties. The ZIP and waterfront information were freely collected 
through Lexington’s open data portal. The Portal, aimed at promoting high-value 
government data, is a collaborative effort between Lexington Fayette-Urban County 
Government (LFUCG) and the Fayette County, Kentucky community.   
Information on the accompanying elementary school districts presents lagged data 
of 33 public elementary school districts in Fayette County, Kentucky over the four years. 
That is, from 2011/2012 academic year to 2014/2015 academic year. The school district 
data were openly collected through Fayette County Public School (FCPS). I structured the 
elementary districts into three performance levels, namely Distinguished, Proficient, and 
Needs Improvement. The performance levels are based on test scores percentiles. Test 
scores are accumulated from the reading, mathematics, social studies, writing, and 
language mechanics tests. The Distinguish level is classified on FCPS metric of 90 to 100 
percentiles; the Proficient level is classified on the FCPS metric of 70 to 89 percentiles, 
and the Needs-Improvement level is classified on 0 to 69 percentiles. In this study, I 
construct the average performance levels by calculating the average percentiles over the 
lagged academic years. Hence, the performance levels of elementary school districts are 
used to explain the influence of schools on potential homeowners. Roughly, in the data, 
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21% of residential sale was transacted in the Distinguished districts, and 34% and 45% of 
sales occurred in the Proficient and Needs Improvement districts. Conforming to my 
expectation, homes in the Distinguished districts sell above average price than homes 
located in Proficient and Needs-Improvement districts. I hypothesize that high-performing 
schools or elementary district with higher percentiles will positively influence residential 
prices. 
C. Parks and Historic Districts Data 
Information on my variables of interest, park and historic district, in a similar manner, was 
collected and constructed through Lexington’s open data portal and Lexington Parks and 
Recreation. These sources are organs of the Lexington government. The data include 95 
parks in Lexington, Fayette. The statistics in Table 2.1 show that the average distance of 
residential homes to a park in the county is about 1.8 kilometers. The closest distance to a 
park is 0.02 kilometers, and the farthest distance is recorded at 18 kilometers. Homes are 
approximated to the nearest park using the Nearest Neighbor (NN) plugin in QGIS. To 
account for park heterogenous preference, I include covariates of park type, if the park is a 
lease or own park, park acreage, and if the park contains a playground. This study also 
controls for if the park contains community, aquatic centers, and athletic field; if the park 
is designated as a dog-friendly park and contain recreational trail if any. My data include 
13 community, 10 neighborhood, 5 golf-course, 1 historic park, 3 minis, 4 
national/Greenways, 4 special-use, and 2 state-owned parks. 
In an effort to facilitate the empirical strategies, the data are stratified into two 
groups to investigate the use-value of parks, see Table 2.2. Homes that have direct access 
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to a park, i.e., share a common fence with a park, are the treatment group. Homes located 
across the street, i.e., directly opposite the access-to-park-homes, make up the control 
group. 678 residential transactions in the data meet the observed criteria of matched 
covariates between the treatment and control groups. Homes with access to parks have an 
average real price of $223,552, while homes located across the street have an average price 
of $210,692. The average price of homes that are immediately around parks is $218,412. 
The ages and median household income remain the only variables that are statistically 
different between the groups. 
Data on the historic district were freely obtained from Lexington Parks and 
Recreation website. I included 17 local historic districts, scattered throughout Fayette 
County, Kentucky. 683 residential transactions, accounting for approximately one percent 
of sales between 2000 and 2016, are recorded in these local historic districts. A dummy is 
established for whether a home is in a historic district. This action allows for residential 
homes within historic districts to be compared to homes located outside local historic 
districts. Up to this moment, the data analysis shows that homes in historic districts sell far 
above the average price of homes outside designated districts. Following Clark & Herrin 
(1997), I interact house age with the historic dummy to control for an unbiased historic 
influence on the home price. To account for the spillover effect of historic districts, I 
established a binary variable, capturing a two-block radius (0.16 km) around historic 
neighborhoods. 446 homes were sold within the two-block radius over the study period, 
2000 to 2017. 
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VI. Econometric Specifications 
My empirical model, as defined by the hedonic function, applies a semi-log functional 
specification to address misspecification bias, Clark & Herrin (1997), Leichenko et al. 
(2000), Cropper et al. (1988), and Kuminoff et al. (2010). With the same intention of 
addressing misspecification bias, I aim to control for endogeneity through the semilog 
functional form. Hence, I regress the logarithm of the real price on the structural 
characteristics, neighborhood and environmental attributes, and time variables to 
accurately evaluate the willingness to pay for parks and historic districts. My general 
covariate approach computes 
logPi = β0 + β1Ei + β2Hi + β3Ni + β4Ti + εi        (7) 
where logP is the dependent variable, denoting the real price of sale for household i. The 
real price is expressed in a logarithmic form to measure and interpret price elasticity. H is 
the vector of structural characteristics, enveloping house age, square footage of the home, 
story, fixed and half bathrooms, garage type, and property acreage. N reflects the vector of 
neighborhood characteristics, including median household income, the performance level 
of elementary school districts, proximity to a waterfront amenity, and ZIP-code area; E is 
the vector of the environmental attributes of interest, park and historic district. T is a vector 
representing the time dummies of the sale’s month and year. Recall, controls for park 
include the park type, the feasibility of lease or own, park acreage, and whether the park 
contains a playground, community or aquatic centers, field or court, dog park, or a 
recreational trail. β depicts the parameter estimates and ε assumes that the Gauss-Markov 
conditions are treated by the data and the functional form. 
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logPijk = β0 + β1ρi + β2ᴨij + β3ρ
2
i + β4Sk + uijk        (8) 
Subscribing to this general model in Equation 7, I designed a specific model, Model 1. I 
employed a covariate stepwise approach to Model 1 to evaluate the influences of parks and 
historic districts on residential homes. The judicious inclusion of covariates in Model 1 
accounts for the implicit prices and the robustness of the coefficients. However, a caveat 
of the covariate approach is that the introduction of controls could exacerbate endogeneity 
in the hedonic model. ρ depicts the distance of household i to a park, and ᴨ depicts if the 
household is in a historic district j. ρ2 accounts for the quadratic relationship of distance, S 
represents the spillover effect of a historic district in neighborhood k, and uijk controls for 
unobservable errors. Considering the stepwise approach, first, I control for a time fixed 
effects; second, I control for housing characteristics; third, I control for neighborhood fixed 
effects; fourth, I account for school fixed effects, and fifth, I control for park amenities 
fixed effects. 
Finally, employing separate hedonic models for parks and historic districts, I built 
a boundary design specification for Model 2 and 3.  
logPi = β0 + β1ρi + β2xi+ ei            (9) 
Model 2, as projected in Equation 9, is the boundary design specification for parks. 
Equation 9 compares the geographic split between the treated areas, homes that have direct 
access to parks, and the control areas, homes that are located across the street. ρ is the 
treatment dummy if house i has direct entry to a park. x is the vector of covariates and e 
controls for random errors. 
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logPi = β0 + β1ᴨi + β2xi+ ei            (10) 
Equation 10 attempts to capture the causal effects of the willingness to pay for historic 
districts. Under this design, the treated areas are homes located within the 17 local historic 
districts in Fayette County, Kentucky. Homes near the local historic districts, within a 0.16 
km radius, are the control areas. ᴨ = the treatment dummy if a house is in a 2-block 
proximity. Model 2 and 3 also incorporate a stepwise approach for the inclusion of 
covariates. 
  A uniting force, combining park and historic districts into a single model in this 
study, is the testimonial of controls. The hedonic model, which is commonly used to 
investigate the values of parks and historic districts, demands the inclusion of independent 
variables or attributes that are of interest. Studies on parks and historic districts usually 
include similar covariates, including structural and neighborhood characteristics. In the 
spirit of capturing controls that are necessary to consider for the variable of interest, 
Kuminoff et al. (2010) highlighted: Neighborhood characteristics that matter to households 
but are not observed by the econometrician, are often expected to be correlated with the 
amenity of interest or other independent variables. Clark & Herrin (1997), focusing on 
historic districts, emphasized that the success of the historic district is strongly predicted 
by the characteristics of the neighborhood. Therefore, I combine parks and historic districts 
in a single study to controls for covariates that are important for parks valuation, when 
influenced by a historic district, and vice versa. That is, investigating historic district 
influence on residential property values when a nearby park is a dependent factor. 
Technically, Model 1 captures the combined effects, while Model 2 and 3 parallelly resign 
to respectively focus on parks and historic districts. The combination of environmental 
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variables might be necessary to research, if the context of the study encompasses and 
prioritizes amenities of parks and historic districts, like urban-rural Fayette County, 
Kentucky. 
VII. Result 
I applied the hedonic analysis, regressing real price on the structural, neighborhood, and 
environmental characteristics of homes, to estimate the willingness to pay for parks and 
historic districts. Model 1, 2, and 3 results are presented in Table 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6. I 
checked all empirical specifications to control for the Gauss-Markov error conditions. On 
average, all models used in this essay satisfied the no-multicollinearity assumptions. 
Illustratively, the average Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of the models ranged from 1.62 
to 3.89.  The models’ average VIF(s) are below the thumb-rule factor of 10. In cases where 
the VIF for a variable is greater than 10, I retained the highly collinear variable so as to 
avoid upward biases in the estimators. For example, squared distance to the nearest park 
was retained, despite being highly collinear, to explain the quadratic relationships. 
Moreover, I use the Ramsey’s Regression Equation Specification Error Test (RESET) to 
examine if my functional forms are specified and freed of omitted variable bias and to point 
out issues of heteroskedasticity. In accordance with Godfrey et al. (1988), I expect that the 
Ramsey test is a good instrument to determine the best functional form since the test is 
swayed by normality and non-normal errors. Ramsey test, diagnosed on my models, rejects 
the null hypotheses that the models have no omitted variable bias, or the models do not 
suffer functional form specifications. Each model has a p-value of 0.0000 which is less 
than 0.05 significance level. This result points out that the functional forms, relative to 
study’s data, do not accurately specify the hedonic model. Bootstrapping the models, to 
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control for misspecifications, I employ the robust statistical variance treatment to my 
estimators. The robust treatment invalidates the analysis of variance (ANOVA). Yet, the 
robust statistical variance treatment explains the significance of the estimators at the p-
value of 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001. 
A. Park Hedonic Results 
Column (1) through (7), presented in Table 2.3, report findings from Model 1. Model 1 
incorporates a covariate semilog specification which builds on a stepwise approach, 
interpreting the estimates of parks and historic districts as elasticities. The coefficients of 
nearest distance to a park are positive and statistically significant at 0.1% in (1) to (7). 
Column (1) finds that as residential homes move a kilometer away from parks, the values 
of homes increase by 7%. I find a similar report in Column (2), when I control for time 
fixed effects of sales months and years. Evident in Column (3), the structural characteristics 
of homes, such as the property acreage, fixed bathroom, and garage type, play a significant 
role in influencing the estimate of the distance to the nearest park. Given the structural 
attributes, the price elasticity of distance to the nearest park decreases by 57%. Resultantly, 
the coefficient of the distance to a park influence on residential sale’s price is 3%, as homes 
move a kilometer away. Controlling for neighborhood fixed effects in Column (4), the 
coefficient decreased from 3% to 2%. School districts' impact on a house induces an effect 
of 50% decrease in the nearness to park estimate, decreasing from 2% to 1%. Column (6), 
controlling for park amenities fixed effects, shows a 100% increase in the coefficient from 
Column (5). Here, as residential homes move a km away from a park, property value 
increases by 2%. Findings from Column (1) to Column (6) indicate that homeowners are 
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willing to pay a depreciated price to live close to a park, although their choices are not 
linear.  
The final stepwise stage in Column (7) investigates the interactions between the 
nearest distance to a park and park amenities. Establishing these interactions is necessary 
to test if the implicit value of living in proximity to a park is interdependent on park 
amenities. We find an expected result in Column (7). Column (7) reports that as the nearest 
distance to a park increases, the estimated value is -0.11. This result implies an 11% 
negative influence on the values of homes, as these homes’ distances increase from a park. 
With respect to park type, being statistically different from zero, as homes distances 
increase from a State-owned park, the homes attract a 3% increase in housing values 
relative to a community park. In addition, respectively, I find a 3%, 24%, 2%, and 13% 
increase in housing values, as homes are located away from a golf course, mini, special 
use, and State-owned parks. Living in proximity to a historic building and neighborhood 
parks, relative to a community park, influence negative values. Respectively and giving 
distance interaction, moving away from historic and neighborhood parks impact housing 
price negatively by 79% and 2%. Also, parks accessible-to-lease, relative to owned-parks, 
attracts a positive housing value for the average price at 14%, as homes distance away. 
With respect to recreational trails, I find that as the distance of homes increases from a park 
with a path and walking trails, homes’ values are negatively influenced by 3% and 1%. 
With respect to other park amenities, I find that as homes distances increase from parks 
with playgrounds, their average housing value decrease by 2%; and as homes distances 
increase from parks with athletic fields or courts, their average housing value increase by 
1%. These interaction terms indicate that historic, neighborhood, and community parks, 
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and amenities like path and walking trails, and playgrounds in parks attract positive use-
values in parks. Contrariwise, the findings also suggest that golf-course, mini, special use, 
State-owned parks, and amenities like parks been leased and athletic field attract external 
costs or negative use-values and externalities in parks. Unlike specifications in Column (1) 
to Column (6), Column (7) implies, on average and considering the interdependencies with 
park features, parks are positively valued. 
Model 1 is a naïve OLS regression. Model 1 might be vulnerable to empirical 
pitfalls suffered by OLS estimators. Acknowledging the caveats of a naïve OLS, I applied 
a park fixed effects specification to the model. Kuminoff et al. (2010) advised on the 
boosting of the parsimonious models by using a spatial fixed effect specification. However, 
there might be potential errors to unobservable spatial attributes which might be in the error 
term and could be correlated with parks and residential home prices, Livy & Klaiber 
(2010). The specifications presented in Table 2.4 include 95 parks in Fayette County, 
Kentucky for the spatial effects. Controlling for the parks fixed effects and time, structural, 
neighborhood, school, and amenities attributes, Column (1) in Table 2.4 shows that as 
homes distance increase in kilometers from parks, residential property values increase by 
1%. I find an opposite effect when distance to parks are interacted park amenities, given 
park fixed effects. Therein, the findings showed an approximate 10% negative influence 
on the average price of homes, as homes locate away from parks. Column (1) in Table 2.4 
suggests that, on average and taking into account the mentioned controls, parks have a 
negative use-value; whereas, Column (2) suggests that parks in Fayette County have 
positive use-value, given the interdependencies on park amenities. 
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The squared distance from a park provides evidence that is vital to explain the 
quadratic relationship of parks’ influence on the price of residential homes, see Figure 2.4. 
As the average distance of a home increases from a park by an equal amount, the value of 
the home depreciates. This depreciation is the range of 0.02% and 0.04%. In monetary 
terms, parks quadratic relationship suggests that homeowners are willing to pay an average 
discount of $400 as their distance from a park increase. In dollar value, the estimate ranges 
from $440 to $660, as the distance to a park increase by another kilometer.   
To further investigate the mixed results from Model 1 findings in Table 2.3 and 2.4, 
I employed a boundary design estimator in Model 2 to estimate park hedonic valuation. 
Model 2, presented in Table 2.5, compares homes that have direct access to parks to homes 
that are immediately located across-the-street from parks. In a similar stepwise approach, 
I control for time fixed effects in Column (1), housing attributes in Column (2), 
neighborhood fixed effects in Column (3), and school and park amenities fixed effects in 
Column (4) and Column (5). Column (1) reveals a positive and statistically significant 
result, at 5% significance level, for the access-to-park dummy. On average, holding all 
things constant, and controlling for time fixed effects, residential properties that have direct 
access to parks sell at 10% above homes located across the street. This finding suggests a 
positive implicit value to have direct access to a park, which is valued at $37,210. The 
report from Column (1) fails to reject my hypothesis that parks have a positive influence 
on the price of residential homes. This result indicates that homes utilize parks’ amenities. 
Controlling for housing and neighborhood characteristics, school performance levels and 
park amenities fixed effects, Column (2) to Column (5) in Model 2 show no significant 
results. These findings in Column (2) to Column (5) imply that homes with direct access 
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to parks are not statistically different from home across the street from parks. The time 
fixed effects of sale month and year are the only factors that are likely to influence homes 
values in a close proximity to parks. In this case, structural characteristics, neighborhood, 
school districts, and park amenities do not influence the park valuation. Nevertheless, in 
terms of park amenities, I find that recreational trails are significant for the positive 
valuation of close proximity to parks, while athletic field negatively affects parks’ values. 
The findings in Model 1 provide mixed results to support my general hypothesis. 
Basically, I expected that parks have a positive impact on the residential homeowners. In 
part, the negative findings I report add to the argument which supports the mixed valuation 
of parks, McConnell and Walls (2005) and Livy and Klaiber (2013). Livy and Klaiber 
(2013) argued that disaggregating parks into amenities could provide an accurate estimate 
for parks. Livy and Klaiber suggest that the negative findings in the aggregate park value 
and park amenities are influenced by noise pollution, renovations that increase potential 
negative externalities (e.g., light renovation), and increased daytime activities. 
B. Historic District Regressions Results 
Results from the hedonic estimates in Model 1, presented in Table 2.3, also present findings 
of the local historic districts. The effect of historic districts on home sale price is 
statistically different at 0.01% through Column (1) to Column (7) in Table 2.3. Column (1) 
presents that homes in designated areas sell at 30% above all homes in Fayette County, 
Kentucky. In monetary terms, the marginal willingness to pay for a historic district is 
$66,020. Controlling for time fixed effects of sale month and year in Column (2), 
residential properties’ values increase by 3% from (1); the value of residential homes in 
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local historic districts becomes 31% higher than the value of homes outside locally 
designated areas. Through Column (3) to Column (5), I find the highest willingness to pay 
for historic districts when controlling respectively for homes structural, neighborhood, and 
school attributes. These reports show a 51% increase in the average price for homes in local 
historic districts, valued at $112,541. Column (3) to Column (5) demonstrate that 
structural, neighborhood, and the school factors, along with the impacts of designated 
areas, have strong influences on property values. Furthermore, when I control for park 
amenities’ fixed effects on property values in (6), historic district estimate decreases by 
25%. This change, by the inclusion of the nearest park features, sets the value of local 
historic district influence on residential homes to 38%. Herein, this impact, given park 
amenities controls, is valued at $83,625. Lastly, in Column (7) of Table 2.3, the hedonic 
value of historic districts influence on homes is 39% greater than homes outside locally 
designated areas. 
I also check in Model 1 for the effect of historic districts on the surrounding 
neighborhood. Findings in Column (1) and Column (2) do not show a statistically 
significant result. The findings in Column (3) through Column (7) indicate that homes 
within a 2-block radius of local historic districts sell higher than homes outside local 
designated in Fayette County, Kentucky. The values of these sales are respectively at 19%, 
22%, 20%, 13%, and 15%. These results might suggest a spillover effect from historic 
districts on the immediate residential neighborhoods. I do not identify this scenario as 
gentrification. Clark and Herrin (1997) employed an analogous approach to measure 
historic district spillover effects. Clark and Herrin tested for historic district spillover 
effects on properties across the street and within a block of the historic boundary.   
40 
 
Model 3, reported in Table 2.6, compared homes in historic districts to similar 
homes in the 2-block neighborhood radius outside the historic districts. In a stepwise 
approach, I control for time fixed effects in Column (1), housing characteristics in Column 
(2), neighborhood fixed effect in Column (3), and school district fixed effects in Column 
(4). All results show that historic districts have a positive effect on housing price, indicating 
a positive impact of housing value greater than the surrounding neighborhoods. The 
historic district estimate is interpreted as 31%, valued at $77,767. The historic district 
estimates, when controlling individually for housing characteristics in Column (2) and 
neighborhood fixed effects in Column (3), is changed to 0.26 from 0.31 in Column (1). In 
Column (2) and Column (3), the influence of historic district on housing price is the same: 
Local historic district increases residential home prices by 26% (valued at $65,224). The 
introduction of school fixed effects in Column (4) increase the estimates of historic districts 
reported in Column (2) and Column (3). In Column (4), I find that local historic district 
influence properties’ values by a 31% increase in the average sale price over surrounding 
residential properties. 
Evident in Model 1 and Model 3, I fail to reject the hypothesis that historic districts 
have a positive influence on residential properties. Overall, the findings in Model 1 and 
Model 3 imply that historic district provides environmental benefits, as well as public and 
private incentives. My study supports the argument that historic districts have a net positive 
impact on property values, substantiating the findings of Clark and Herrin (1997), 
Leichenko et al. (2000), and Coulson & Lahr (2005). These results covering local historic 
districts from the context of Fayette County, Kentucky also apply to local historic districts 
in the United States. Housing and neighborhood characteristics, as well as school district 
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effects, might shape the dynamics of historic districts across cities. Fayette County, 
Kentucky is an urban-rural environment. It would be subtle to use a large dataset from 
rural, urban-rural, and urban cities to estimate historic districts (i.e., local, State, and 
Nationally) influence on residential properties. 
VIII. Discussion and Implications 
Results from the hedonic analysis, with application to environmental studies, provide 
implications for the use-value of environmental goods. Recall, environmental goods may 
not have a structured market to price their use-values. However, the environment can be 
valued implicitly through the housing market. 
A. Parks: Mitigating Negative Externalities  
The use-value of parks remain a sensitive issue to private homeowners and the public who 
utilize parks. Assessing the performance and utilization of parks is also a sensitive issue 
with key authorities who maintain, fund, conserve, and study this type of green, Klaiber 
and Phaneuf (2010). Due to the mixed evidence of the negative and positive implicit values 
of parks in this study, including Walls (2005) and Livy and Klaiber (2013), I recommend 
that mitigation strategies should be designed to address the negative externalities linked to 
parks.  
One of the mechanisms that can be used to obtain parks, embedded with positive 
externalities and rid of negative use values, is to conduct a use-value surveys or reviews 
research. Given Fayette County, Kentucky’s residential market, the implicit result of park 
values may only apply to residential homeowners near a park. These results might be 
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limited in reflecting the overall public valuation of parks and attached features. Using 
surveys or reviews can help parks’ authorities and key role players to redirect funding, 
develop projects, and maintain specific park types and amenities. The survey also allows 
for detecting and strategizing the mitigation of negative externalities in parks. By way of 
illustration, Lexington, Kentucky government’s office of Park and Recreation is 
accumulating responses by means of face to face conversations, surveys, and public 
meetings to make a master plan for parks and recreation in Fayette County, Park and 
Recreation (2017). One of the intentions of these public engagements is finding out what 
people want in parks. Hitherto, Fayette County, Kentucky park authority has surveyed 952 
households, categorizing their feedback into places, programs, and actions. Interestingly, 
the park authority integrates, into their survey, questions about household barriers to park. 
However, within the pillar of what people want, the authority could incorporate a fourth 
category, called negative park features and activities. Subsequently, by this action, 
mitigation strategies can be designed to address negative externalities associated parks.   
The negative externalities encountered by private homeowners might be attributed 
to noise pollution, renovations that increase potential negative externalities and increased 
daytime activities. Private residents and park authorities can alleviate the indirect and 
unintentional negative effects of parks through the following strategies: Rallying to express 
views on issues that affect homeowners directly; calling the local authorities; lobbying for 
local ordinance to reinforce regulations to curb nuisance violations in and around parks; 
engineering infrastructures to lessen light or noise pollution, and redesigning parking 
strategies around parks vehicles. For example, homeowners could exercise free speech on 
parklands, in conformity with the first amendment right of free speech. 
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B. Historic District: Investment Analysis 
Findings, at least robust in the coefficient signs in Model 1 and 3, for local historic districts 
show that historic districts have a positive influence on housing value. This implies that 
benefits such as tax credits and positive neighborhood upkeep surpass the maintenance cost 
and hurdles associated with historic districts. These implications support the argument of 
shared economic security and incentives in historic districts. Tax incentive programs for 
historic districts is a strong positive force. The tax incentive program supports 
rehabilitation in historic districts by providing a 20% tax credit for the certified 
rehabilitation of certified historic structures, Historic Preservation Tax Incentives (2012). 
This benefit is instrumental in facilitating economic development in historic neighbors. 
Leichenko et al. (2000) the cause of preservation tax incentives since higher property 
values in historic districts also means paying higher property tax. Homeowners or sellers 
can also enjoy direct public benefits in historic districts. For example, the Technical 
Preservation Service of the National Park Service provides technical resources to assist and 
guide the maintenance of historic buildings. Locally, historic authorities also provide 
technical assistance to owners of historic properties. 
My discussion does not emphasize the cost associated with historic districts. 
Nevertheless, I communicate important risks associated with historic districts. Even though 
the study results imply that the tax credit program for historic homes is effective, a 
homeowner might face the risk of unharmonized certification process and construction 
permits huddles. Secondly, risks might include neglected homes in the neighborhood, thus 
creating an ugly character of the historic district. Thirdly, less rigid regulations in historic 
districts could fuel disinvestments, delayed maintenance, and contribute to inappropriate 
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materials being used. Moreover, homeowners or sellers may have a conflict of interest in 
using modern materials or technologies versus sticking to certified materials for historic 
districts. A final risk could be renovation misconceptions among neighbors in a historic 
district.   
Most studies, arguing against historic district settlements, have repeatedly claimed 
that historic districts promote gentrification pressures. For instance, Conde (2007) 
criticized and opposed the program of historic districts. Conde portrays historic districts as 
neighborhoods that discourage interracial integration and promote segregation, especially 
in favor of white families. Groups like the Virginia Land Right Coalition reasoned that 
poor people will be squeezed out of their communities because property values will 
increase, and tax benefits are illegal. A priori, there seems to be little or no disclaimer from 
historic district authorities on these claims. Illustratively, Lexington Preservation, via its 
website, communicates licensing, permit development systems, and review processes. 
Lexington Preservation neither has an established disclaimer to distance historic districts 
from the stained characterization of gentrification nor recognizable actions which 
demonstrate that historic authorities support equity for all potential homeowners, social 
integration, and lawful justifications. I recommend that the National Registry of Historic 
Places and local historic district authorities should openly revoke connections to 
gentrification. 
IX. Conclusion 
Studies, local inhabitants, and public authorities usually support the conversation of green 
space. Parks and historic districts are green space amenities intended to endorse benefits 
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like recreational, public events, environmental sustainability, and private investments. 
Despite the positive utilities associated with parks and historic districts, these green spaces 
do face challenges. Investigating the implicit values of parks and historic districts, I employ 
a hedonic model. The log of the real sale price is regressed on the structural, neighborhood, 
and environmental attributes of homes to analyze parks and historic districts influences on 
the residential market. My empirical specifications are presented in three models. In these 
models, I use a stepwise approach for the inclusion of controls and a robust treatment for 
measurement errors. 
Finding from the covariate approach reports a negative implicit value for parks. 
This result indicates that parks, hosting features, do have externalities which negatively 
affect the use-value of parks. Through the hedonic approach, it is evident that factors of 
sale month and year, and housing, neighborhood and environmental attributes do affect the 
magnitude of park valuation. When I interact distance to the nearest park with the park 
amenities, I find that parks have positive use-values. This result suggests that a park 
valuation is interdependent on its amenities. Following the covariate approach, I also 
measured the value for parks by comparing properties that have direct access to parks to 
properties that are located across the street. In this case, I also find a positive willingness 
to pay for parks, signaling positive use-values. Given the covariate and boundary design 
models, parks and the amenities hosted by parks have mixed valuation. Parks positive use-
values are tied to the type of park and features like multi-purpose trails. Negative use-
values might be caused by factors of noise, light pollution, and undesirable park usage, 
Livy and Klaiber (2010). Finally, I find that as homes double their distance from parks, the 
value of park increases. Findings from all models show that historic districts have a positive 
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value on residential properties above homes located outside the designated areas. The result 
is correspondingly true when I compare historic districts to other areas in Fayette County, 
Kentucky. These findings imply strong positive environmental benefits and economic 
securities associated with historic districts. I also find a positive impact on homes in the 
two-block radius neighborhoods surrounding designated areas. I implicate this finding to a 
spillover effect of the historic districts on the surrounding neighborhoods.  
I discussed mitigation strategies to address the negative effects and externalities of 
parks. I recommend that parks’ authorities intentionally use surveys to detect and to 
mitigate negative parks externalities and improve undesirable facilities; private owners in 
proximity to parks should voice, report, and channel grievances from park nuisance to local 
authorities. In terms of designated districts, I discussed the positive benefits of investing, 
either as a homeowner or seller, in the historic district residential market. I also highlight 
risks that might impede benefits and investments in historic areas. Chiefly, I recommend 
to National, State, and local historic authorities to adopt communications and interventions 
that could directly address gentrification and actions that could prove that historic district 
stands for societal, environmental, and economic integration. 
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X. Tables 
Table 2.1. Summary Statistics of the Continuous Variables of Structural 
Attributes and Distance to Parks   
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Price (real dollars) 64,727 $220,070 $150,730 $16,202 $5,591,398 
House Age (years) 64,727 34 25 0 206 
Square Footage (linear feet) 64,727 1,842 749 416 10,762 
Story (unit) 64,727 1.4 0.4 1 3 
Fixed Bathroom (unit) 64,727 2 1 1 10 
Half Bathroom (unit) 64,727 0.5 0.5 0 4 
Property acreage (acres) 64,727 0.22 0.18 0.002 9.75 
Nearest Park Distance (km) 64,727 1.8 1.44 0.02 18 
Median Income (dollars) 64,727 $56,667 $20,253 $12,288 $16,8103 
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Table 2.2. Comparing Residential Homes that have Access-to-Park to Homes 
located Across-the-Street 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Access to Park  
(Treatment Group) 
407 Homes 
 
Across from Park  
(Control Group) 
271 Homes 
 
 
T-Statistics 
(Pr(|T| > |t|) 
Mean Mean p-value 
Real Price (dollars) $223,552 $210,692 0.1857 
Age (years) 25 29 0.0079* 
Square Size (square feet) 2,008 1,924 0.1431 
Story (unit-feet) 1.5 1.5 0.0769 
Fixed Bathroom (unit) 2 2 0.2580   
Half Bathroom (Unit) 0.3 0.3 0.8587 
Property acreage (acres) 0.19 0.19 0.311 
Median Income (dollars) $60,324 $55,424 0.0003* 
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Table 2.3. Hedonic Estimates of Park: Findings of Distance to Nearest Park  
Dependent variable: Log of real price adjusted to the year 2016 (mean: $220,067, Std. Dev: $150,730) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Nearest park  0.07*** 0.07*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02*** -0.11*** 
 (30.97) (30.99) (16.99) (6.84) (5.92) (9.32) (-7.33) 
Distance 
squared 
(km) 
-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 
 (-8.77) (-8.42) (-10.34) (-4.81) (-4.68) (-9.86) (-6.53) 
Historic 
district 
0.30*** 0.31*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.38*** 0.39*** 
 (16.91) (17.41) (28.89) (24.12) (24.28) (28.92) (17.07) 
Hist. (spill 
effect) 
-0.07 -0.06 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 
 (-1.67) (-1.64) (6.81) (9.74) (9.27) (9.14) (6.69) 
Time FEs  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
House 
controls 
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Neighborho
od controls  
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School FEs  No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Park 
amenities 
Fes 
No No No No No Yes No 
Distance to 
golf-course 
park 
      0.03** 
       (3.11) 
Distance to 
historic 
bldg. park. 
      -0.79*** 
       (-8.73) 
Distance to 
mini park 
      0.24*** 
       (13.05) 
Distance to 
neighborhoo
d park 
      -0.02*** 
       (-6.61) 
Distance to 
national 
park 
      0.07 
       (0.01) 
Distance to 
special use 
park 
      0.02** 
       (2.73) 
Distance to 
State-owned 
park 
      0.13*** 
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Note: Significant at t statistics: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001. Column (1) to 
Column (7) represents a semi-log specification. 
 
 
 
Table 2.3. (Continued) 
Dependent variable: Log of real price adjusted to the year 2016 (mean: $220,067, Std. Dev: $150,730) 
Variable                  (1)           (2)   (3)           (4)   (5)                  (6)                 (7) 
       (9.21) 
Distance to 
a leased 
park 
      0.14*** 
       (10.12) 
Distance to 
park with 
path trail 
      -0.03*** 
       (-11.63) 
Distance to 
park with 
shared trail 
      0.01 
       (-0.79) 
Distance to 
park with 
walking trail 
      -0.01*** 
       (-4.30) 
Distance to 
a park with 
playground 
      -0.02*** 
       (-7.13) 
Distance to 
park with 
comm center 
      -0.02*** 
       (-1.14) 
Distance to 
park with 
pool  
      0.01 
       (0.08) 
Distance to 
park with 
athl. Field 
      0.01*** 
       (4.64) 
        
Obs 64,727 64,727 64,727 64,727 64,727 64,727 64,727 
R2 0.02 0.04 0.69 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.76 
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Table 2.4. Hedonic Estimates of Park: The Inclusion of Park Fixed Effects to 
Nearest Distance 
Dependent variable: Log of real price adjusted to the year 2016 (mean: $220,067, Std. 
Dev: $150,730) 
Variable (1) (2) 
Nearest park (km) 0.01*** -0.06** 
 (4.16) (4.17) 
Distance squared (km) -0.002*** -0.003*** 
 (-4.81) (-4.97) 
Historic district controls Yes Yes 
Park FEs (n = 95 parks) Yes Yes 
Time FEs (nyear=17; 
nmonth=12) 
Yes Yes 
House controls Yes Yes 
Neighborhood controls  Yes Yes 
School FEs (n=3 levels) Yes Yes 
Distance to golf-course 
park 
 0.07*** 
  (5.38) 
Distance to historic bldg. 
park. 
 -0.50*** 
  (-5.12) 
Distance to mini park  0.20*** 
  (10.38) 
Distance to neighborhood 
park 
 0.002 
  (-0.72) 
Distance to national park  -0.1 
  (-1.06) 
Distance to special use 
park 
 0.30*** 
  (16.63) 
Distance to State-owned 
park 
 0.08*** 
  (5.53) 
Distance to a leased park  0.8*** 
  (5.53) 
Distance to park with path 
trail 
 -0.03*** 
  (-10.09) 
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Note: Significant at t statistics: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001. Column (1) to 
Column (2) represents a semi-log specification. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.4. (Continued) 
Dependent variable: Log of real price adjusted to the year 2016 (mean: $220,067, Std. 
Dev: $150,730) 
Variable (1) (2) 
Distance to park with 
shared trail 
 0.04*** 
  (5.79) 
Distance to park with 
walking trail 
 0.001 
  (0.52) 
Distance to a park with 
playground 
 0.01*** 
  (3.40) 
Distance to park with 
comm center 
 0.04** 
  (2.98) 
Distance to park with pool 
center 
 -0.03 
  (-4.52) 
Distance to park with athl. 
Field 
 -0.01** 
  (-2.59) 
   
Observations 64,727 64,727 
R2 0.78 0.78 
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Table 2.5. Hedonic Estimates of Direct Access-to-Park:  Boundary Design Regression 
Dependent variable Log of real price adjusted to year 2016 (mean: $372,108, Std. Dev: 
$138,408) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Access to Park (dummy, default 
= Across-the-street properties) 
0.10* 0.03 0.003 0.0001 -0.003 
 (2.18) (1.70) (0.19) (0.04) (-0.16) 
Time FEs (nyear=17; nmonth=12) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
House controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Neighborhood FEs  No No Yes Yes Yes 
Park amenities FEs No No No No Yes 
      
Observation 678 678 678 678 678 
R2 0.04 0.78 0.85 0.86 0.87 
Note: Significant at t statistics: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001. Column (1) to 
Column (5) represents a semi-log specification. 
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Table 2.6. Hedonic Estimates of Historic District using Boundary Design 
Regression 
Dependent variable Log of real price adjusted to year 2016 (mean: $250,861, Std. Dev: 
$141,244) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Historic District (default = 2 block 
neighborhood) 
0.31**** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.31*** 
 (7.07) (8.20) (8.82) (8.17) 
Time FEs (nyear=17; nmonth=12) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
House controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Neighborhood FEs  No No Yes Yes 
School Fes No No No Yes 
     
Observation 1,095 1,095 1,095 1,095 
R2 0.12 0.61 0.66 0.70 
Note: Significant at t statistics: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001. Column (1) to 
Column (4) represents a semi-log specification. 
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XI. Figures 
Figure 2.1. Fayette County, Kentucky Residential Transactions, 2000 to 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The map depicts the cluster of homes sold in the study period, between 2000 
and 2016, embedded in Fayette County, Kentucky Census Block Groups.   
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Figure 2.2. Fayette County, Kentucky Neighborhood Map, 2000 to 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: The map shows the clusters of homes in Fayette County, Kentucky over the 
study period linked to the neighborhood attributes of ZIP areas, elementary school districts, 
and waterfront amenities.  
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Figure 2.3. Fayette County, Kentucky Parks and Historical District Map, 2000 to 
2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: An illustration of residential home sales in Fayette County, Kentucky around 
my variables of interest, parks and historic districts, over study dimension, 2000 and 2016. 
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Figure 2.4. Quadratic Plot of Park Distance in Kilometer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: A quadratic plot demonstrating the relationship of the implicit value for 
residential homes, as the homes average distance increase from the nearest park. Distance 
is measured in kilometer (km) and shown on the horizontal axis.  
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CHAPTER THREE: WILLINGNESS TO AVOID LEAD RISK IN WATER 
QUALITY: ARE THERE INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES? 
Most Americans have access to water, yet America faces water challenges including lead 
contamination. My research asked questions about potential lead risk and lead-risk 
information asymmetries among homeowners. Using data from the Property Valuation 
Administrator in Fayette County, Kentucky, I answer the research questions through the 
application of hedonic analysis. I find an implicit positive value to avoid lead risk. I also 
report that buyers in high-lead risk neighborhoods might be less informed. I recommend to 
States and local authorities to periodically communicate lead risk to the public. 
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I. Introduction 
The United States access to water is rated at 99.26%, yet America is constrained with water 
quality assurance, pointing to risks of lead in the water supply systems. Accordingly, a 
quality water supply should be freed from meaningful physical, chemical, biological, or 
harmful radiological substances, including lead contamination. The Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) regulations set lead concentration to be less than 15 parts per 
billion (ppb) in a sampled 10% of a water zone. EPA revealed that nine States are reporting 
safe lead levels in their water supplies. However, about 5,300 States' water systems might 
be in violation of the lead rules, and there is a lack of residents’ trust when it comes to 
reporting, testing, and treatment for lead contamination in water supplies, CNN (2016). 
Residents could possess elementary knowledge about lead contamination, but they might 
not be certain in determining the level of lead in their drinking water. The specific problem 
lies in the identification of lead contamination in a community water supply. The risk of 
lead in a water system can be certainly identified or can be challenging to detect. In a 
certain case of lead-risk identification, some counties in America report with confidence 
that their geographical subdivisions have no known lead risk and other counties confirm 
lead contents in their water supply. On the gray front, some counties cannot point out if 
their homes, water meters, water treatment and distribution systems contain lead materials.  
Given this background, I ask the following questions: How does lead exposure risk 
in a water supply system affect housing values? Is there a presence of information 
asymmetries among homeowners relative to lead in their water supplies? I hypothesized 
that residential homeowners will pay more for lead-free water. I expect that homeowners 
in the high lead-risk water areas might have little information on their water supply 
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compared to low-lead exposure neighborhoods. I assume asymmetric information in high-
risk areas because water lead-risk is not required to be reported during home sale 
transactions. Besides, real estate experts observe that a water problem is frequently 
concealed above all other home disclosures, Gassett (2016). In this study, I hope to measure 
the influence of lead-risk level on residential home sale transactions and to communicate 
policy implications for homeowners, home sellers, and policymakers to address the 
concern of lead-risk in the water systems. 
This paper’s contribution to the water quality literature lies in assessing the hedonic 
valuation of a probable lead risk in drinking water and searching for the possibility of 
asymmetric information. The literature on water hedonic pricing ranges from valuing 
surface water to pricing water through the land market. Other studies, not using hedonic 
analysis, have also evaluated the willingness to pay for municipal water supply and 
drinking water quality. Leggett and Bockstael (2000) used hedonic analysis to demonstrate 
the effect of water quality on waterfront properties in the Chesapeake Bay area. Using eight 
empirical specifications, Leggett and Bockstael reports show that as bacteria level increase 
in the Bay, property values reduce by 5%. Buck et al. (2014) also contribute to this paper 
through their supportive argument that a stable market can be used to infer the value of an 
environmental good. Piper (2003) evaluates the impact of water quality on municipal water 
price and residential water demand. Piper’s results support the argument that households 
appreciate an improved water quality system. Powell & Allee’s (1990) results, from a 
contingent valuation survey carried out in four towns in Massachusetts, show that people 
are willing to pay more for drinking water quality, especially when they have experienced 
contamination harms. Jordan & Elnagheeb (1993) find that 23% of households were 
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uncertain of their drinking water quality. Trending studies are addressing the general course 
of lead in the national water supply. Theising (2017) is discussing “Lead pipes, prescriptive 
policy and property values, lead pipes and prescriptive policy”; Irwin (2017) on 
“Homebuyer risk perception in the face of potential lead exposure”, and Grooms et al. 
(2017) on “Drinking water and lead: Evidence from local treatment changes in North 
Carolina”.  
The theoretical framework of this essay is underpinned by the hedonic theory. 
Rosen (1974) presents that goods are valued for their utility bearing attributes. A class of 
differentiated products has a vector of measurable characteristics which define a set of 
hedonic prices. I assume the housing market is a differentiated product market, which has 
a bundle of characteristics. Residential homes host characteristics like square feet, 
structural design of the home, being close to an environmental amenity or being linked to 
a certain water quality zone. Overall, the theory calls for information on the structural 
characteristics, neighborhood and environmental attributes, and other controls to capture 
implicit price effects. I depart from Rosen on the assumptions of no second-hand market 
and the perception of identical characteristics. Akerlof’s (1970) theory debated on quality 
in the market. He pointed out good and bad qualities in market mechanisms and argued 
that rational consumers will demand better quality. To carry out the hedonic analysis, my 
dataset merges information from Fayette County, Kentucky Property Valuation 
Administrator, Vox Media, and other sources like Census Bureau. The study period 
covered a 17-year period (2000 to 2016) and included 70,619 sales transactions that 
occurred in Fayette County, Kentucky. To evaluate the willingness to pay for lead risk in 
the water quality supply, I applied empirical specifications of ordinary least squares, two-
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stage least squares, and propensity score matching. To check for asymmetric information, 
I constructed a deterministic model, advised by Kurlat and Stroebel (2015), to test for 
differences between appreciating rates in the low and high lead water risk zones.  
In this paper, Section 2 presents the problem of lead contamination in water 
supplies and the specific problem of identifying lead risk in water communities. Section 3 
provides a review of the hedonic literature, water quality papers, and hints on trending 
studies in the case of lead in the United States. Section 4 describes the theories that support 
the study and the data is described in Section 5. I examine the research questions in Section 
6 through the empirical specifications, including a deterministic test. Section 7 shows the 
findings from lead-risk influence on the residential market and reports the test of the 
deterministic model on asymmetric information. Finally, Section 8 gives a summary, 
provides implications, and suggests a way to improve the study’s gaps. 
II. Background 
Global water supply is very important to every region of the world, as water supply issues 
sprout from health to environmental concerns. For example, despite North America, 
including Canada, accessibility level of water is above the global average of 90.7%, the 
United States face challenges of water allocation and quality. The alarming risk of lead 
level in drinking water is one of the water quality challenges. According to the Safe 
Drinking Water Act (SDWA), a quality water supply is free from meaningful physical, 
chemical, biological, or harmful radiological substances. Relative to the risk of lead 
contamination, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates that 
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the lead concentration in public water systems must not exceed an action level of 15 parts 
per billion (ppb) in more than 10% of customers' tap samples. 
In March 2016, CNBC News article published: America's water crisis goes beyond 
Flint, Michigan… impacting millions of lives and costing billions of dollars in damages.  
The new wave of lead awareness reverberates the need for financing and investing in the 
Nation’s water infrastructures to protect citizens from serious public health dangers. EPA 
disclosed that only nine States are reporting safe levels of lead in their water supplies. 
These States include Alabama, Arkansas, Hawaii, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nevada, North 
Dakota, South Dakota and Tennessee. 5,300 States' water systems, supplying about 
eighteen million Americans, are believed to be in violation of lead rules. From a residential 
viewpoint, homeowners have expressed a lack of trustworthiness in the reporting, testing, 
and treatment for lead contamination in water supplies CNN (2016).  
Residents may have basic knowledge about how one can be exposed to lead 
contamination, but homeowners might not know the levels of lead in their drinking water. 
Sometimes, through macro-observation, residents can easily point out that their water 
supply is contaminated. For instance, when the city of Flint, Michigan switched to the Flint 
River for supply, residents noticed and complained about the discolored water. Besides, 
respectively, pediatricians and independent studies noticed the high level of lead in children 
and the local water supply, Jordan (2016). Locating lead pipes, which cause contaminations 
in communities’ water supplies, can be a challenge. The central problem lies in identifying 
water services or supplies that are contaminated by lead. Identifying whether water supplies 
are contaminated by lead can be a certain case or a gray area between certainty and 
uncertainty. In the case of certainty, some counties in the Nation report with confidence 
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that their geographical subdivisions have no known lead contents in their water services, 
while others confirm lead contents in their water services. Illustrating the former on the 
certainty of no lead contamination, a few counties in Southwest Ohio, namely Butler, 
Englewood, Fairborn, Fairfield, and Green counties, report no lead contamination in their 
water services. These counties are certain, claiming meters were replaced; their 
communities contain only iron, copper, and plastic pipes; new developments and buildings 
were constructed after 1998, and their water treatment and distribution systems were 
created after 1957. Regarding the latter certain case on confirmed lead risk, some counties 
in the region have validated the presence of lead risks in their areas.  Herein, counties such 
as Miamisburg, New Carlisle, Oakwood, Oxford, and Sidney counties in Southwest Ohio 
confirmed lead services on the basis that their water supply connections and service lines 
in public and private properties contain lead in their water distribution systems. That is, 
there are proven lead lines, solders, fixtures, or goosenecks; and most homes were built 
between 1900 and 1950, and as far back as 1895. Counties like Piqua and Franklin in 
Southwest Ohio report their water systems as probable lead areas because of old 
developments, while lead pipes are being replaced, Driscoll (2017). 
This study asks these research questions: What is the hedonic valuation of lead 
exposure risk in the water supply? Are there information asymmetries among homeowners 
relative to lead-risk in their water supplies? I expect that residential homeowners will pay 
more price for good water quality. I also expect, on average, homeowners in high-lead 
water exposure areas may have little information on their water supply compared to low 
lead exposure neighborhoods. The latter hypothesis assumes that asymmetric information 
is present, mostly for high-risk than low-risk areas, see Figure 3.1.   
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It is important to consider the effect of a probable lead risk on housing valuation 
due to the health concerns, environmental engagements, and decisions that are needed to 
finance the replacement of lead service lines and lead components in United States’ water-
communities. Lead contamination in the water supply is an aged infrastructure problem 
which is caused by older pipes that contain lead. Lead may enter water systems as it 
dissolves through lead-pipes when water passes through the distribution channels. One of 
the main sources of lead contamination is lead service lines that connect water mains to 
residential properties. Also, pipes within homes, soldered with lead, might contribute to 
lead contamination, as water sits idle in these pipes while the system is not in use in the 
home, Kentucky Division of Water (2017). In 1986, amendments to the drinking water act 
prohibited the use of the not-lead-free pipe, plumbing fitting, fixture, solder, or flux in 
public, residential, and nonresidential buildings. Not until 1996, it became unlawful for 
any person to introduce into the market any pipe, plumbing fitting or fixture which is not 
lead-free, EPA (2017) and Cornell Law School (2017). Lead toxicity gives rise to serious 
health defects in the human body. Most especially, lead harm is severe to little children. 
10% to 20% of a lead intake in children is caused when water, which is poisoned by lead, 
is consumed, Rabin (2008). Lead intake and accumulation promote weakened cognitive 
development in children, damage kidney function, produce cardiovascular problems, and 
negatively affect the brain, liver, and bones. In extreme cases, lead intake might result in 
death. In short, the presence of lead in a water supply can engender health risks to the 
public. 
Financing the replacement of lead in public and private properties is a major 
mitigating, or better say, eradicating strategy in the United States. There have been 
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alternative financing approaches, designed or being proposed. Since 1996, the Drinking 
Water State Revolving Fund (DWSRF), a federal-state partnership, has promoted the 
financing of safe water systems in each State. Following the Flint, Michigan crisis in 2014, 
the White House pledged more than five-billion dollars to improve water quality in the 
nation. Today, Federal agencies such as CDC and EPA, tasked with tackling lead 
contamination, have experienced a fiscal year (FY) budget cut. For example, CDC 
encountered a 17% budget reduction in FY 2017/2018, counting a cut in areas of 
prevention, environmental health, and toxic substances, CDC (2017). In addition to 
financing mechanisms, a legislative bill is debating the provision of loans or grants to 
finance the removal of lead pipes. This Lead Act, LRB-1934, calls for authorities to be 
given to local governments for the provision of an opportunity and for a local water utility 
to provide financial assistance for replacing the lead service lines, Cowles (2017). 
III. Literature Review 
This paper contributes to the water quality literature by assessing the hedonic valuation of 
a probable lead exposure risk in drinking water and to search for the possibility of 
asymmetric information relative to lead risk in the residential market. The literature on 
water hedonic pricing ranges from the surface water valuation of waterfront properties to 
pricing water through the land market. Other studies, not using hedonic analysis have also 
evaluated the willingness to pay for municipal water supply and drinking water quality. 
Together, these studies have considered and investigated the value of surface and 
groundwater quality amid water challenges. For instance, valuation papers have covered 
damages caused by sediments, bacteria, nutrients, and soil erosion-related pollutants in 
water networks such as streams, lakes, reservoirs, and estuaries. At the time of this 
68 
 
research, there are a series of forthcoming papers that are addressing the general course of 
lead in the national water supply.  
A. Hedonic Valuation of Water Quality  
The attempt to understand the implicit valuation of environmental goods in a nonmarket 
scenario is a path I aim to build my analysis on. There may not be an explicit market to 
price whether homeowners place an appreciation or depreciation on their water quality. 
However, given this nonmarket scenario, the hedonic analysis is a tool that can tease out 
the willingness to pay for lead exposure risk. Leggett and Bockstael (2000) used hedonic 
analysis to demonstrate the effect of water quality on waterfront properties in the 
Chesapeake Bay area. Leggett and Bockstael influence the approach and analysis of this 
paper through their argued hypothesis that good water quality positively affects the values 
of residential properties. Accordingly, homeowners are expected to bid for prices of 
residential units which have a desirable level of characteristics, including water quality. It 
is expected that locals will be willing to pay an appreciated price for low exposure risk 
neighborhoods. The low-lead risk is certainly a higher environmental quality. The authors 
point out to a robust empirical work as a convincing factor in considering the significance 
of the environmental result. In this case, a robust empirical work means cleaning the 
analysis of ambiguities, such as functional form, and addressing market segmentation and 
multicollinearity. So, Leggett and Bockstael (2000) measured water quality, referencing 
waterfront amenity to properties, on the level of fecal coliform bacteria existing in the 
water. In their study, it was assumed that information on coliform bacteria is spatially and 
explicitly available to the public. That is, residential homeowners in the context of the study 
had symmetric information on the level of fecal in their surface water. This assumption is 
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vital to this paper because it sets the stage to picture the argument of information 
asymmetries. Leggett and Bockstael (2000) constructed eight empirical specifications to 
estimate the hedonic price using an ordinary least square (OLS) estimator. Within the scope 
of their study, Anne Arundel County, Maryland, Leggett and Bockstael find that an 
increasing level of bacteria in the Bay significantly reduces property values by 5%. 
Buck et al. (2014) research also influence this paper, through their supportive 
argument, by using a stable market to infer the value of an environmental good; a reminder 
that the hedonic procedure is common to influencing environmental policies. Buck et al. 
use evidence from the land market to infer the value of irrigation water, an environmental 
nonmarket good. Unlike using the OLS cross-sectional data estimator, the authors support 
the application of a hedonic model that uses a fixed effect estimator. Besides, Buck et al. 
(2014) highlight the use of an instrumental variable model, as used by Kuminoff & Pope 
(2012) and Bishop & Timmins (2013), as an alternate approach which could consistently 
and comparably estimate the willingness to pay for an environmental good. This advice is 
adhered to, in my econometric section, as one of the robust estimators. Despite the 
uniqueness of the hedonic literature, other empirical models can be used to estimate the 
implicit value of water quality. For example, Bockstael et al. (1987) applied models of 
systems of demands, discrete choice, and hedonic travel cost to validate the willingness to 
pay for water quality. 
B. Non-Hedonic Valuation of Residential Water Supply 
It is almost inevitable to argue against the premise that high-quality water supply is valued 
above low-quality water supply. This argument is also necessary to set the expectation 
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when measuring the impact of lead exposure risk in water quality on the residential market. 
An array of non-hedonic studies have evidently proven the vertical structure of water 
valuation. Piper (2003) evaluates the impacts and implications of water quality on 
municipal water price and residential water demand. Piper work assessed the extent to 
which a water quality influences residential water supply expense system and impacts the 
households’ prices. Piper (2003) supports the arguments that households have a higher 
willingness to pay for improved domestic water quality. In the water-use model, Piper 
conclusion holds that poor water quality leads to higher treatment cost and higher water 
rates. Jordan & Elnagheeb (1993), Powell & Allee (1990), and Schultz & Lindsay’s (1990) 
hypotheses also agree on the willingness to pay for an improved water quality. Jordan & 
Elnagheeb (1993) surveyed people’s willingness to pay for improved drinking water 
quality and the perception of water impurity in their areas. Jordan & Elnagheeb, using the 
contingent valuation method in Georgia, find that 23% of households were uncertain of 
their drinking water quality. This finding is essential to communicate the presence of 
asymmetric information among residents in a water community. Powell & Allee’s (1990) 
results, from a contingent valuation survey carried out in four towns in Massachusetts, 
show that people are willing to pay more for drinking water quality, especially when they 
have experienced contamination harms. Finally, demonstrating homeowners’ willingness 
to pay for water quality, Schultz & Lindsay’s (1990) results showed that both residents and 
the community were willing to pay a higher price for a hypothetical groundwater plan. 
Forthcoming studies are equally addressing the environmental constraint of lead 
risks. Some of the impending studies include discussions on lead pipes, prescriptive policy 
and property values, Theising (2017); lead pipes and prescriptive policy: Estimating 
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homebuyer risk perception in the face of potential lead exposure, Irwin (2017); and 
drinking water and lead exposure: Evidence from local treatment changes in North 
Carolina, Grooms et al., (2017). 
IV. Economic Model 
The core of the analysis in this paper revolves around the hedonic theory. In accordance 
with Rosen (1974), the hedonic hypothesis presents that goods are valued for their utility 
bearing attributes. Therein, the theory draws that a class of differentiated products, which 
has a vector of measurable objective characteristics, define a set of hedonic prices. The 
housing market, which has a bundle of characteristics, meets the assumption of a 
differentiated product market. Residential homes hold different characteristics such as 
square feet, structural design of the home, being close to an environmental amenity, or 
proximity to a certain water quality zone. Paramount to the theory is the argument of spatial 
economic equilibrium: A consolidated set of implicit prices guides both the consumers and 
producers’ locational decisions in a characteristic space. Market equilibrium, a price 
clearing force which guides the decisions of both buyers and sellers, coordinate the implicit 
prices from a set of characteristics. Analyzing water systems’ exposure to lead risk through 
the hedonic framework, the results will yield a hedonic price for lead exposure areas. The 
bundle of characteristics in the housing market includes structural, neighborhood, 
environmental and time attributes.  
P = f(H, N, T…, E)   (11) 
Where, P, the market price is a function of the vectors of housing characteristics H, 
neighborhood attributes N, time effect T, and other utilities, including a vector of 
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environmental amenities, E. Although homeowners may subjectively value lead risk, 
according to Rosen, it is assumed that all homeowners perceive identical characteristics. 
Put in another sense, homeowners are knowledgeable about their water quality. It is also 
assumed that differentiated homes may also be sold in a separate, yet highly interrelated 
market.  
On the producers’ front, Rosen (1974) presents that producers carefully consider 
the package of characteristics to assembly in a locational decision. Residential home sellers 
want to equally minimize their factor costs and produce optimal utilities. Given the latter 
producer motive and arguing in favor of asymmetric information, some home sellers could 
conceal information such as the probable level of lead contamination in the water supply. 
Not intentionally, this action could be carried out in the spirit of minimizing cost and 
presenting optimal utilities to potential residential buyers. 
P(z) = CM (M, H, N, …, E)   (12) 
Equation 12 manifests that P(z), the total cost of all attributes, is dependent on the function 
of positive and increasing cost CM, relative to the number of homes produced by a 
residential seller M and the assembled attributes, the vectors of H, N, and E. For a market 
equilibrium to be satisfied, Equation 12 must be equal to a consumer bid function, as shown 
in Equation 13.  Equation 13 is a value function where P(z) is the amount that consumers 
are willing to pay for attributes (H, N, …, E) at a fixed utility which is optimally chosen. α, 
depicting optimally chosen, indicates that the utility bundles differ from household to 
household and utility dependents on budget constraints, the household income y. 
P(z) = U (M, H, N, …, E; α, y)   (13) 
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In spite of the many inferences that can be achieved through the hedonic theory, the 
theory is clouded with assumptions and faced with empirical challenges. To name a few, 
empirical challenges related to the hedonic model include omitted variable bias, 
multicollinearity, choice of functional form, market segmentation, and attitude to risks, 
Leggett and Bockstael (2000) and Hanley et al. (2002).  First, my empirical evidence of 
lead exposure could be potentially bias if my model omits a variable which is important to 
explain either the housing price or the lead risk variable. The variables incorporated in this 
study, relative to the structural, environmental, and neighborhood attributes, might be 
highly collinear. Thirdly, potential homeowners attitude to risks, such as avoiding crimes, 
less energy efficient homes, and environmental disamenities, could also introduce a biased 
estimate. Finally, choosing either a parsimonious or flexible functional form is affiliated 
with a benefit and cost. For instance, in terms of empirical benefits, traditional 
parsimonious forms like linear and logarithmic functions can have economic 
interpretations and be more robust to misspecification, Cropper et al. (1988) and Kuminoff 
et al. (2010).  
My point of departure from Rosen (1974) is on the assumptions of no second-hand 
market and symmetric information. I disapprove the former assumption of no second-hand 
market in this paper because the residential market is not purely consumed. There is 
overwhelming evidence of resale homes in the residential market. On the latter assumption, 
Rosen assumes that although consumers may differ in their subjective valuations of 
differentiated packages, all consumers’ perceptions or appraisals of a number of 
characteristics embodied is identical. In respect to the focus of this essay, I question the 
latter assumption and align my analysis with the theory of asymmetric information. Akerlof 
74 
 
(1970) logically discussed the uncertainty of quality in market mechanisms. Practically 
observing the housing market through the eye of Akerlof, there are homes with good and 
bad qualities. Rationally, consumers will demand better quality. 
Qd = D(P, µ)   (14) 
µ = µ(P)   (15) 
Qd depicts the demand for homes; P depicts price, and µ depicts water quality. In 
equilibrium, Akerlof assumed that supply equals demand for given average quality. 
Equation 15 depicts that the demand for water quality depends on price. Yet, Equation 14 
and 15 may not hold true in the presence of asymmetric information. Relative to probable 
lead risk, a buyer may perform a housing transaction without knowing whether the home 
is located within a relatively low or high lead exposure zone. Even though it is possible to 
value lead exposure risk through the residential market, there might be a market failure of 
asymmetric information associated with the housing market. This market inefficiency 
might be attributed to hidden type model, wherein residential property sellers may have 
private information on the water supply that potential buyers are not knowledgeable of, 
Snyder & Nicholson (2008). However, over a length of time, homeowners may acquire a 
fair knowledge of the quality of their water supply. Knowing then the quality of their water, 
the home’s resale may in part manifest the asymmetric information. Consequently, the null 
hypothesis establishes that homes in low-risk areas may sell cheaper or at the same price 
relative to homes in high-risk areas due to information asymmetries. 
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V. Data 
The hedonic function calls for information on the housing characteristics, neighborhood 
and environmental attributes, and other control variables in order to empirically capture the 
implicit price effects on residential properties. I collected information from multiple 
sources and joined the information through a Geo-information system (GIS) technique 
using the Quantum GIS (QGIS) software. Table 3.1 gives the summary statistics of the 
continuous variables of home, neighborhood, and environmental attributes used in this 
study. Considering the study period, the data cover 17 years, 2000 to 2016, featuring 70,619 
sales transactions that occurred in Fayette County, Kentucky. 
A. Lead Risk Data in the Context of Fayette Kentucky 
Fayette County, a Commonwealth county in Kentucky, encounters the same concerns of 
water challenges, including lead risks. Locals frequently ask questions about their drinking 
water quality like “Why do we have cloudy or milky water? Why do we have brown or 
yellow water? Is there lead in our water? What is the difference between hard and soft 
water?", Kentucky American Water (2017).  
“Because service lines, faucet fixtures, household pipes, and/or solder can 
contribute significantly to the lead and copper levels in tap water, we ask our customers to 
collect samples in their homes. These samples are collected on a routine basis (systems 
begin by monitoring once every six months with reductions in sampling possible that allow 
for monitoring once every three years) at homes that are considered vulnerable based on 
when they were constructed, and the materials used.  We do this monitoring according to 
the requirements of the Lead and Copper Rule and use the results to confirm that our 
corrosion control strategy is operating as intended.” 
 
This quotation is a statement from Kentucky American Water, revealing that the water 
system in Fayette County, or State at large, do encounter probable lead challenges. 
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Kentucky has an active program to address lead. The program contains laws and 
regulations on lead, including trainings, certifications, and investigations of lead 
complaints.  Although the average water quality in Fayette County, Kentucky is relatively 
good, Fayette County, Kentucky presents an interesting variation in the study of lead 
contamination. I do not have an actual information on lead contaminants in the Fayette 
water systems. Nevertheless, this study uses an exogenous proxy called lead exposure risk, 
collected from Vox Media, to account for the lead in Fayette County, Kentucky’s water 
supplies. Lead-risk zones in Fayette County, Kentucky, structured at the Census Tract 
level, varies from potentially low to high-risk areas, see Figure 3.2. Older neighborhoods 
in Fayette County, Kentucky are rated as highly probable exposure zones, while newer 
residential areas in the County are rated as low probable exposure zones. Homes in the 
older sections of Fayette County might have lead pipes and solders, yet the search and 
replace plan is undergoing, WKYT (2016). Vox teamed with epidemiologists from 
Washington State’s Department of Health to estimate the risk levels in every geographic 
area of the United States. The data is originally calculated from the Census data. Similar to 
the United States, Fayette County, Kentucky is systematized into 10 lead-risk layers. In an 
ascending order, 1 represents the lowest risk area, while 10 represents the highest risk area. 
This exogenous proxy, lead exposure risk does not confirm that there is an actual lead 
contaminant in a water supply. Instead, lead paint, the age of the house, and the poverty 
rate are some of the attributing factors used by the researchers to construct the lead-risk 
variable and applied by this study to indicate lead risk in the water supply. 
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B. Housing and Neighborhood Characteristics Data 
Structural attributes data are necessary to control for the housing characteristics influence 
on residential homes. The Housing transaction data is accredited to Fayette County, 
Kentucky’s Property Valuation Administrator (PVA). PVA collects and maintains 
residential property data, and track ownership changes and update changing characteristics 
of properties in the County. The PVA data provide information on home price, month and 
year of the sales transaction, the year the home was built, the building square feet, garage 
type, fixed and half bathrooms, and the property acreage. The sale price is the study 
dependent variable. I adjust this price to accurately reflect the current market value of 
homes, using 2016 consumer price index (CPI 2016 = 240.007).  
The data analysis shows that homes are mostly sold at or above the average price 
during the months of May, June, July, August, and September. June and July are the peak 
months of sales. Respectively, about 11% of residential homes, over the study period, are 
sold in June and July and sold above the average inflated price of $219,328. The slowest 
sales months in Fayette County, Kentucky are January and February. January contributes 
to the number of homes sold at 5% and February at 6%. Moreover, the peak sales in the 
county occurred during the years of 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively at 8%, 8%, and 
7%. These sales reveal the year fixed effects, as well as the relative economic times in those 
years. An additional structural description showed that about 64% of homes in the study 
period has attached garage, followed by homes with detached garage at 15% and homes 
with no garage at 14%. 
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Controlling for the neighborhood attributes, I collected data factors from the 
Lexington government, including Fayette County Public School System (FCPS). The data 
on neighborhood attributes were collected through the county’s open access data portal. 
Presented in dichotomous variables, information on the neighborhood and the environment 
include if the home is located within a historic district if it located within 0.1 miles to a 
park, and if it is within 0.06 miles to a water network. Other neighborhood factors are the 
associated elementary school district boundary, Zone Improvement Plan (ZIP) area, and 
the household median income at a Census Tract level. There are 17 local historic districts 
included in the data. Being a place of cultural, historical, and environmental attractions, 
historic districts may provide benefits to residential homeowners in the form of higher 
property value and tax breaks. Homeowners in Fayette County, Kentucky also enjoy the 
amenities of about 100 parks. The features in these parks range from the types of parks 
such as community, golf-course, or neighborhood parks and recreational facilities like 
aquatic centers, and multi-purpose trails. I observe that approximately 10% of the homes 
in the data are waterfront properties. Waterfronts in Fayette County, Kentucky include 
creeks, runs, tributaries, folks, and branches. In the same spirit of neighborhood factors, I 
include 14 ZIP areas, about 33 elementary school districts, and the median household 
incomes of Fayette County, Kentucky to control for potential influences on buyers and 
seller’s decisions. ZIP code areas give forth the linked socioeconomic factors of a 
neighborhood. Median income averaged at $57,559, might depict homeowner preference, 
money constraint, and financial ability to address lead risk. The elementary school districts 
control for the associated performance level on residential properties.  Measured by the 
average test score percentiles from 2011 to 2015, this study categorized the elementary 
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districts by their average performance levels into Distinguished (90 – 100 percentiles), 
Proficient (70 – 89 percentiles), or Needs Improvement (0 – 69 percentiles). 
C. Analyzing Neighborhood Characteristics by Relative Lead Exposure Risk 
For further data analysis, the lead-risk exposure zones are organized into two groups for 
matching purposes. As shown in Figure 3.2, lead-risk level 6 to 10 are identified as 
neighborhoods having the highest probability of lead exposure. This is my treatment group, 
accounting for 37% of residential sales. Lead-risk areas in level 1 to 5 indicate areas with 
the lowest probability of lead exposure. This zone represents the control group, accounting 
for 63% of residential sales in Fayette County, Kentucky. At the 5% significance level, 
Table 3.2 finds that variables in the two groups, treatment, and control, are statistically 
different. For example, the average median income for homes in the high lead exposure 
zones is $43,637 while the average median income for homes in the low lead-risk areas is 
$65,722. Homes in the low exposure zone have an average age of 26 years, whereas homes 
in the high exposure zone have an average age of 52 years. 
VI. Empirical Estimation 
The equilibrium economic phenomena, as presented in Equation 11, underpins my general 
model for the first phase of the analysis. In the first phase, I incorporate empirical strategies 
of covariates, two-stage least squares (2SLS), and propensity score matching (PSM). These 
methodologies allow for a comparable and robust analysis of the influence of lead-risk, 
relative to the water supply, on the residential market. My study second phase focuses on 
a sub-sample of a one-time resale of residential homes in Fayette County to check for an 
asymmetric information relative to lead risk. 
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A. Hedonic Valuation of Lead Risk Phase 
My first empirical estimator forms a covariate approach to account for the implicit value 
of lead risk. The inclusion of explanatory variables could determine an unbiased estimate 
for my variable of interest. A linear hedonic functional form is chosen to estimate the 
hedonic valuation of lead exposure risk. The linear function form, although susceptible to 
omitted variable bias, will produce low mean percentage errors, Cropper et al. (1988) and 
Kuminoff et al. (2010).  
Pi = ẞ0 + ẞEEi + ẞHHi + ẞNNi + ẞYYi + εi   (16) 
Equation 16 shows the relationship between the linear price P of household i, and the 
vectors of structural characteristics H, and neighborhood and environmental attributes N. 
E represents the proxy of lead-risk exposure to a house. Y is the household median income 
based on the associated Census Tract. Variables in the structural vector include the age of 
the home, square feet of the home, fixed and half bathrooms, story, property acreage, sale’s 
month and year, and garage type. Neighborhood and environmental variables include if the 
home is located within a historic district, the associated elementary district performance 
level, and the home’s proximity to a water network or park. ε assumes the Gauss-Markov 
conditions of the idiosyncratic errors.  
My second empirical specification sketches an instrumental variable (IV) procedure 
on Equation 16. Since this study does not have an actual variable for water quality, the two-
stage least squares (2SLS) approach, using strong instruments, is ideal to accurately 
estimate the influence of water quality on a home price. The first stage regress lead 
exposure risk E on the instruments of year prohibition dummy ϴi (i.e., if the home was 
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built before 1998), the age of the house Ai, ZIP area Zi, and the median household income 
Yi. The final instrumental term Φi is constructed through the interaction of the instrumental 
variable. 
  E = γ0 + γ1ϴi + γ1Ai + γ2Zi + γ3Yi + γ4Φi + ui   (17) 
In many States, such as Kentucky and Illinois, lead poisoning is pointed out through 
the ZIP areas. Campaigns preventing children from lead poisoning do focus on ZIP areas 
with high risk of lead. These areas are used in formulating the level of lead risk in 
communities. Income is also instrumental in determining lead risks. Homes or 
communities with low incomes may be vulnerable to lead poisoning. Living below the 
poverty line, families and communities cannot finance or facilitate the replacement of lead 
materials or prevent lead poisoning in their private water systems. These families might 
hardly purchase water filters to treat their water supplies. The age of the home may also 
contribute to a situation of no, low, or high lead exposure risk. Even though the 1986 
amendments to the drinking water system prohibited the use of lead substances in public, 
residential and nonresidential buildings, it was in the year 1996 it became illegal to use 
lead materials. So, homes built up to 1997 may have a high likelihood of being exposed to 
lead poisoning. In the final instrumental factor, the interaction term points out the 
interdependencies among the variables which could substantially contribute to the 
vulnerability of lead risk in the water system. These instruments justify the exogenous 
decisions of whether a homeowner will purchase a home with a probable low risk of lead 
in the water supply, or not.  
Pi = ẞ0 + ẞÊÊi + ẞHHi + ẞNNi + ui   (18) 
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Building on the covariate strategy in Equation 16, the predicted Ê in equation 17 is used as 
a proxy for E in the second stage of the IV approach. My instruments may not be perfect 
as it may be correlated with price. Even so, I assume that these variables are strongly 
correlated with the endogenous variable, Ê. I also assume that the predicted lead risk 
variable is uncorrelated with the error term ui. 
Applying the dummies, which were constructed from the relatively low and high-
risk lead neighborhoods, my final verification strategy for causality uses a propensity score 
matching (PSM). The PSM approach assures that unexpected prediction can be removed 
from the observations. Homes located in the relatively high-risk area are positioned as the 
treatment group, while homes located in the relatively low lead exposure areas are joined 
to the control group. Following Dawid (1979) conditional independence notation, T Џ X | 
U, T is the treatment group and X and U respectively depict the observed and unobserved 
covariates. An elementary hypothesis of the PSM states that the assigned treatment group 
and the observed covariates are conditionally independent given the true propensity score.  
X Џ T | ᴨ (X)   (19) 
Equation 19, from Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) theorem, assumes that a matched 
treatment-control pair is homogeneous in the covariates ᴨ(X). That is, the treatment and 
control homes in the lead risk zones will be matched based on the same distribution of X. 
Matching the true propensity score will result in the observed covariates of structural, 
neighborhood, and environmental characteristics being asymptotically balanced between 
treatment and control groups. 
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B. Testing for Asymmetric Information in Water Quality Phase 
Addressing the concern of asymmetric information, I subscribe to empirical advice from 
Kurlat and Stroebel (2015). These authors test for information asymmetries in the real 
estate markets. My data is not perfect to conform to the predictions put forth by Kurlat and 
Stroebel. An ideal dataset would present information on sellers and categorize the sellers 
by their level of information, more informed versus less-informed. However, I compute 
and test for asymmetric information through resale information. The resale value is a 
summation of the structural characteristics, the attractiveness of the neighborhood and 
environmental attributes, the loading factor of a house to its neighborhood, and 
idiosyncratic shocks. In conformance with the arguments from Akerlof (1970) and Kurlat 
and Stroebel (2015), at the time of resale, it is assumed that information about the value of 
the home is known. Home sellers are likely to acquire better and plentiful information, 
relative to knowledge on lead risk than potential buyers. For example, assuming that 
current homeowners and sellers are rational, they use information from their local water 
utilities and authorities like the EPA to get information on lead risks for their homes or 
neighborhoods. In the case of an asymmetric information, ceteris paribus, homes in 
relatively low-lead risk water zones might be better than is commonly known or reflected 
in local housing price transactions. The same applies to the reverse. The reverse is: Homes 
in high lead risk water neighborhoods are worse off than commonly known or reflected in 
home sales. Thus, due to hidden-type information, relatively high-lead risk water 
neighborhoods might be overrated or horizontally valued, compared to homes in the 
relatively low lead risk water neighborhoods. Problems with water in homes may not 
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disclose by home sellers. These assumptions facilitated the building of a deterministic 
model, as formulated in Equation 18, to check for asymmetric information. 
Æ𝑗 =   ∑ (𝑉1/𝑉0)1/𝑡  −  1𝑛𝑖=1    (20) 
Æ represents the average appreciating rate of resale homes in low lead risk water 
neighborhoods if j = 0, and average appreciating rate of homes in high lead risk water 
neighborhood if j = 1. V1 is the resale price offered by the seller and V0 is the initial or 
former price. t represents the number of time homeowners occupied the property or 
engaged by the sellers. If Æ for low-risk water area is not statistically different from the 
high-risk Æ or not vertically higher, this would suggest an asymmetric information on 
water quality. Expressed differently, if the high-lead water risk Æ is higher and statistically 
different from the averaged low-risk Æ, this would also imply an asymmetric information. 
According to Kurlat’s predictions, informed buyers in the housing market are able to select 
better homes at the same prices than uninformed buyers. With these means, informed 
buyers will be willing to pay for quality structure homes in a better neighborhood. On the 
contrary, uninformed buyers will be willing to pay more for houses in a relative overrated 
neighborhood. Notwithstanding, uninformed buyers can buy homes in both underrated and 
overrated neighborhoods. Again, I expect, on average, homeowners in high lead risk areas 
may have little information on lead in their water supply compared to low lead risk 
neighborhoods. 
VII. Result 
This section provides findings for the lead risk hedonic valuation and gives a report for the 
possibility of a hidden type information, with respect to water quality in Fayette County, 
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Kentucky. Initially, in the hedonic valuation phase, I used the unit level of lead risk 
exposure in the water supply as my variable of interest. The later stochastic and 
deterministic models used the segmented high-risk (treatment group) and low-risk (control 
group) zones variables. Results from the hedonic phase are compared to conventional water 
quality studies. Findings from the test for asymmetric information are linked to Kurlat and 
Stroebel (2015) to interpret uninformedness in the market. 
A. Water Lead-Risk Influence on Residential Housing Price 
Model 1, defined in Equation 16, allows this study to control for factors that might 
influence house price and my implicit variable of interest, lead risk in water quality. This 
specification permits us to determine housing values and the implicit water quality, as the 
lead risk increase or decrease by a unit. The result of the OLS specification is presented in 
Table 3.3. I used the robust error treatment to correct for functional and misspecification 
errors. Given the robust treatment, I do not analyze the percent of variation explained by 
the model. Still, I find an R-squared of 72% in Model 1. 
I find an unexpected result for water quality in Model 1, as reported in Table 3.3. 
Water lead-risk is not statistically significant at the p-value of 0.05. On this account, I reject 
the hypothesis that good water quality influences the values of residential homes. A 
background investigation, using a stepwise control technique, show that water quality 
variable alone, and time fixed effects of months and years, do not have a strong goodness 
of fit to explain the linear model. Water quality risk alone produced a significant result, but 
an R-squared of 0.05; the inclusion of sales months produced an R-squared of 0.05, and 
sales year, 0.06. Additionally, controlling for the structural, neighborhood, and 
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environmental attributes increase the explanatory power of the model to 72%. 
Nevertheless, the finding for the lead-risk variable was not statistically significant at 0.1 or 
0.05 p-value. 
I applied the Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) estimator to examine the robustness 
of water quality risk. The 2SLS estimator modeled that the quality of water relative to lead 
risk is identified by exogenous instruments, including house age, median household 
income, lead prohibition fixed effects, and ZIP areas. Initial analysis of the instruments 
showed a positive correlation between house age and water quality exposure level at 0.69, 
and a negative correlation between median household income and water quality risk level 
at 0.66. These findings indicate a respective positive and negative associations of water 
risk with house age and median household income. 
The coefficients of the instruments are statistically significant at 5% significance 
level in the first stage of the IV estimator, except for ZIP area 40504. House age was 
positive and statistically significant from zero. An increase in the age of the house increases 
the level of lead risk in the water quality. An increase in the median income of household 
results in a decrease in water quality risk, a negative and significant result. The result from 
the second stage also produces an unexpected result of water quality risk, see Table 3.4 An 
increase in water risk level increases property values. This estimate of water quality risk 
level, valued at $164, is positive and non-significant at 5% significance level. Besides 
interpreting the results from the 2SLS estimator, I perform post-estimation tests to evaluate 
the uniqueness of the 2SLS estimator. First, I perform the test of endogeneity, where the 
null hypothesis argues that the instrumental variables are exogenous. The robust chi-
squared and regression p-values were 0.6227, thus failing to reject the null hypothesis. This 
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indicates that the instruments were exogenous in nature, and the control specification (the 
OLS Model) did not suffer from endogeneity problems; it was not meant to treat water lead 
risk as an exogenous variable and using the 2SLS was not necessary. Second, I test for the 
strength of the 1st stage. I hypothesized that the instruments were weak. The partial R-
squared was 0.57, rejecting the null hypothesis that the instruments were weak. Finally, I 
performed an over-identification (over-id) test for the 2SLS model on the null that the set 
of instruments is valid, and the model is correctly specified. Findings from the over-id test, 
at a p-value of 0.0000, reject the null. This indicates an overidentification of the 2SLS 
model. 
In the final model application, which aims to evaluate lead risk hedonic price, I 
measure the consistency of the water lead risk estimate through the PSM model. Looking 
back on Table 3.2, the simple ANOVA test showed that the covariates of the treatment and 
control groups are statistically different. Obviously, these differences alarm the challenge 
of confounding factors between the treatment and control groups. The second check for 
confounders employed the standard difference test, using the standard deviations of the 
covariates means. Results from the standard deviation test also validate the possibility of 
confounders between the treatment and control groups. 
At first, when I used the entire dataset of 70,619, I was unable to find a balanced 
match between the treatment and control groups. I failed on multiple attempts, despite 
trying techniques such as changing the functional form from linear to quadratic and cubic 
function. I also failed when I applied a probit and logistic regressions, and matching 
algorithm like the nearest neighborhood (NN) and Caliper & Caliper and Radius. For a 
successful matching, I reassessed the data and chose 4,352 observations for the propensity 
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score. Note that, I used only continuous variables in new data for the PSM. Along with the 
property acreage control, all dichotomous covariates were dropped because these 
covariates could not balance the groups, or they violated the matching overlapping 
assumptions. I applied a probit regression on a common support matching algorithm to 
estimate the Average Treatment on the Treated effect (ATT). I regressed the treated groups 
on the covariates of age, age-squared, story, fixed and half bathrooms, and the median 
income for the household at the Census Tract level. 
Holding all other variables constant, while controlling for the structural 
characteristics common to homes in the groups, Table 3.5 shows that there is a probability 
that residential homes in the high lead water risk neighborhood is devalued by $11,1010. 
This result, computed via the ATT model, is statistically significant. The conventional 
expectation for water quality is satisfied: In this model, I fail to reject the hypothesis of a 
higher willingness to pay to avoid lead-risk in a neighborhood water quality. The ATT 
findings indicate an implicit negative value of neighborhoods or homes that are susceptible 
to high lead-risk. Table 3.6, the balance table, and Figure 3.4, the balance plot, tabularly 
and graphically represent the balanced matching. Primarily, the balance table ensures and 
communicates that my covariates for the treatment and controls were not different to 
promote confounding. Figure 3.4 visually reinforced Table 3.6 to show that my structural 
covariates were not biased, and I can trust the ATT estimate for the water quality valuation, 
in term of water lead risk. Approximately 29% of the sub-dataset (i.e., 1,289 observations) 
was matched, while 71% of the data was untreated by the propensity estimator.   
Unlike the OLS and 2SLS models which are positive and not significant, the PSM 
estimate coheres with conventional findings on water quality. For instance, Leggett and 
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Bockstael (2000) find a negative value for increased bacteria in water, and Piper (2003) 
supports the argument that poor water quality leads to higher treatment cost and higher 
water rates. I join and support the argument of a positive willingness to pay for good water 
quality. Residents will positively value environmental attributes, including water quality 
which is free from harm or negative externalities. 
B. Asymmetric Information in Water Quality 
Given that a residential home seller is not legally responsible to disclose water quality 
problems of a home or neighborhood during a sale or resale, I expect that asymmetric 
information for hidden lead risk in water quality might be present. This might be true, 
especially for homes in the high-risk water neighborhoods. I constructed a deterministic 
appreciation rate in Equation 20 to test for any sign of asymmetric information. Hence, I 
compare the average resale appreciation rates between homes in the high-risk and homes 
in the low-risk water neighborhoods. To achieve this measure, I first extract a subset of 
18,984 observations from the data. These observations are the unique first resales that 
occurred in Fayette County, Kentucky, considering the data period. During the data 
cleaning process, I dropped all resales that happened less than six months of the previous 
sales. Note, it is evident in the dataset that resale occurred up to eight times for some homes 
in the county between 2000 and 2018. 
Table 3.7 reports the findings from the deterministic test. The deterministic test 
compared the average appreciation rates between the treatment and control groups. 
Validated by the p-value of 0.05 in Table 3.7, I fail to reject the null expectation that, on 
average, homeowners in high lead risk areas may have little information on lead in their 
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water supply compared to low lead risk neighborhoods. Table 3.7 reports that homes in the 
high-risk water neighborhoods have a vertical appreciation rate relative to homes in the 
low-risk water zones, and these groups are statistically different from zero. The average 
appreciation rate for a probable high-risk area is about 52% and the resale appreciation rate 
for homes in the low-risk neighborhood is about 39%. The vertical difference in the 
appreciation rate is 13%. This finding is consistent with Kurlat and Stroebel’s expectations 
and results. Informed buyers are likely to use their information in an overrated 
neighborhood, while uninformed buyers are incapable of distinguishing both the bad 
qualities in both neighborhoods and homes. Hence, the deterministic test suggests the 
presence of information asymmetries relative to residents who live in a high lead-risk water 
neighborhood. The results imply that these residents are unable to detect, gain perfect 
information, or pay attention to the revealed information which would then a give gist of 
the level of lead risk in their water supplies. Although results from the deterministic model 
may suggest the presence of asymmetric information, the results herein are potentially 
biased because important independent and explanatory variables might have been left out 
when I specified Equation 20. For example, adding the number of years homeowners or 
sellers occupied residential homes to Equation 20, I could expect the average appreciation 
rates to shift to the true values. 
VIII. Conclusion and Implications 
I argue that residential homeowners will pay more for improved water quality, and 
homeowners in the high lead risk water areas may have little information on their water 
supply relative to low lead exposure neighborhoods. Nevertheless, during the time of 
resale, home sellers are likely to obtain better information, relative to knowledge on lead 
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risk, than potential buyers. I applied the hedonic analysis to empirically measure the effect 
of lead risk on housing values. The OLS, 2SLS, and PSM specifications were employed to 
validate the robustness of the implicit lead-risk value. 
Accounting only for structural attributes, holding all things constant, I find that 
homeowners in the relatively low-lead risk water communities are implicitly willing to pay 
$11,101 to avoid the likelihood of being poisoned by lead. Analyzed in the deterministic 
model of appreciation rate, I find that the average appreciation rate from the resale of homes 
in the probable low-risk area (52%) is higher than the average appreciation rate for homes 
in the low-risk neighborhood (39%) by 13%. This difference suggests, ceteris paribus, 
buyers in the low-risk areas are better informed about lead risk than the high-risk buyers. 
Acquiring a higher appreciation rate for homes in the high-lead risk neighborhood could 
also imply that potential buyers are uninformed and incapable of distinguishing the quality 
of high lead risks in water neighborhoods. Findings from my stochastic and deterministic 
models may be vulnerable to empirical pitfalls and may violate regression assumptions, 
including omitted variable bias. Future studies could detect omitted variables in this 
research and add important variables to the models. 
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IX. Tables 
Table 3.1. Summary Statistic of Continuous Variables of Structural Attributes, 
Median Household Income and Water Lead-Risk Levels. 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Real Price (dollars) 70,619 $219,328 $148,676 $16,202 $5,649,844 
House Age (years) 70,619 35 25 1 207 
Home Size (square feet) 70,619 1,846 744 416 10,762 
Story 70,619 1.4 0.5 1 3 
Fixed Bathroom  70,619 2 1 1 10 
Half Bathroom (unit) 70,619 0.5 0.5 0 4 
Home acreage  70,619 0.2 0.2 0.002 9.8 
Median Income  70,619 $57,559 $20,915 $12,288 $168,103 
Lead Risk (unit) 70,619 4 3 1 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93 
 
Table 3.2. Comparative Summary Statistics of Water Lead-Risk Treatment and Control 
Groups 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Low Lead Risk 
Zone (Control 
Group) 
44,519 Homes 
 
High Lead Risk 
Zone (Treatment 
Group) 
26,100 Homes 
 
 
T-Statistics (Pr(|T| 
> |t|) 
 
Mean 
 
Mean 
 
p-value 
Real Price (dollars) 246111 173643 0.0000*** 
Lead Risk (unit) 2 7 0.0000*** 
House Age (years) 26 52 0.0000*** 
Home Square Feet (linear 
feet) 
2010 1566 0.0000*** 
Story (unit) 1.5 1.3 0.0000***    
Fixed Bathroom (unit) 2 2 0.0000***   
Half Bathroom (unit) 0.6 0.3 0.0000*** 
Property acreage (acres) 0.23 0.20 0.0000*** 
Median Income (dollars) 65722 43637 0.0000*** 
Note: Significant at t statistics: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001.  
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Table 3.3. Estimates of Hedonic Model (OLS Estimator): Lead Risk in Water 
Quality 
Dependent variable real price adjusted to year 2016 (mean: $219,328, Std. Dev: 
$148,676) 
Variable Estimate Robust Std. 
Error 
t-stat p-value 
Water Quality (n=10 levels, μ 
= 4) 
.204 .230 0.89 0.373 
House age (μ = 35) -.237*** .045 -5.26 0.0000 
Median Income (μ = $57,559) .32*** .03 10.33 0.0000 
Time fixed effects Yes    
House characteristics controls Yes    
Neighborhood fixed effects  Yes    
School fixed effect Yes    
     
Observation 70,619    
R2 0.72    
Note: Significant at t statistics: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001. Table 3.3 is a 
linear specification. The dependent variable, the real price is divided by 1000. 
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Table 3.4. Estimates of Hedonic Model (2SLS Estimator): Lead Risk in Water 
Quality 
Dependent variable real price adjusted to year 2016 (mean: $219,328, Std. Dev: 
$148,676) 
Variable Estimate Robust Std. 
Error 
t-stat p-value 
Water Quality (n=10 levels, μ 
= 4) 
.164 .234 .70 0.483 
Time fixed effects Yes    
House characteristics controls Yes    
Neighborhood fixed effects  Yes    
School fixed effect Yes    
     
Observation 70,619    
R2 0.70    
Note: Significant at t statistics: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001. Table 3.4 is a 
linear specification. The dependent variable, the real price is divided by 1000. 
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Note: Significant at t statistics: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001. Table 3.5 is a 
linear specification. The dependent variable, the real price is divided by 1000. 
 
 
Note: Significant at t statistics: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.5. Propensity Score Matching Results for Treated Groups (High-Risk Areas)  
Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
Average Treatment on 
Treated 
182.820 193.921 -11.101 5.286 -2.10 
      
Observation 1,289     
Pseudo R2 0.32     
Table 3.6. Balance Table for the Covariate Matching 
Variable Treated Controls Differen
ce 
Bias 
Reduction 
P-value 
Age 53 53 -0.28 97.8% 0.460 
Square Feet 1744 1746 2.7 97.7% 0.436 
Story 1.2 1.2 -0.001 92.0% 0.574 
Fixed Bath 2 2 0.0172 99% 0.917 
Half Bath .4 .4 -0.002 98.4% 0.937 
Median Household Income 41.72 40.97 -0.749 95.9% 0.074 
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Note: Significant at t statistics: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.7. Testing for Asymmetric Information via the Average Appreciation 
Rates between High and Low Water Lead-Risk Communities. 
Dependent variable Log of real price adjusted to year 2016 (mean: 40.86%, Std. Dev: 
75%) 
  
 
Water-Quality 
Neighborhood 
Sample 
(Obs.) 
Mean 
Appreciation 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
[Confidence 
Interval at 95%] 
 
T-stat (P-
value) 
High-risk Pb 
Exposure 
(Level 6 – 10)  
3,897 52.47 49.65 49.65  –  55.29  
0.0000 
Low-risk Pb 
Exposure 
(Level 1 – 5) 
4,558 38.97 37.09 37.09  –  40.85 
      
Difference  13.50    
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X. Figures 
Figure 3.1. Depicting the Assumption of Water Quality Information Asymmetries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Visually illustrating homes that may be prone to concealed lead risk 
information in the residential market. 
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Figure 3.2. Lead Risk Layers in Fayette County, Kentucky 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: A snapshot of lead risk map zoomed to Fayette, Kentucky. The map is 
accredited to Rad Cunningham, Sarah Frostenson, and Vox media. Risk increases in 
ascending order on the scale of 1 to 10. 
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Figure 3.3. Fayette County, Kentucky Attributes Map 
 
 
Figure 3.3: A cluster of residential home transactions in Fayette County over the period 
2000 to 2016. Figure 3.3 graphically illustrates the physical neighborhood characteristics 
that might influence the price of residential homes.   
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Figure 3.4. Plotting the Matching between the Treatment and Control Groups 
(Water Lead-Risk) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: The reference line portrays a region of no or less biasness at the critical value 
of 0.05. Note: The p>chi2 for the Propensity Score Matching in Table 3.6 has a value of 
0.637. This result also portrays and validates a balance between the treatment and control 
groups. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION 
Environmental debates sprout from climate change to air pollution. This thesis is a 
discourse on some of the common environmental issues confronted in the United States of 
America. In this regard, I focused on the valuations of green spaces (namely, parks and 
historic districts) and water pollution (in terms of lead contamination in the water supply).  
The two essays in this thesis, on green space and water lead-risk, are connected by 
the concept of the hedonic analysis. Throughout the essays, I use similar variables, 
including structural, neighborhood, and environmental attributes, to implicitly measure 
parks, historic districts, and lead risk levels in the water supply. The dataset, provided by 
Fayette County, Kentucky’s Property Valuation Administrator, and the context of Fayette 
County, Kentucky set the empirical stage to value the environmental issues of interests. 
The first essay, presented in Chapter 2, showed how parks and historic districts play a key 
role in the green space campaigns. These attributes are valued for their use-values. Parks 
are used for health and recreation, hiking, picnicking, and serve as a cherished community 
and diversified space. Besides preserving historic and cultural properties, historic districts 
conserve the environment and support energy efficient policies. Despite the positive 
environmental attributes that stream from parks and historically designated areas, 
disapprovals or intruding concerns are raised to disclose the under-utilization and 
underperformances of parks, and the gentrification and high costs that may be associated 
with historic districts. Given these arguments on the positive and negative attributes of 
parks and historic districts, I questioned the influence of parks and historic districts on 
homeowners in order to disentangle their use-values. One should care about these use-
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values because parks and historic districts have the propensity to influence property values, 
private investments, and budgetary financing.  
So, in Chapter 2, I find that the willingness to pay for parks is negative, indicating 
that parks host features which negatively affects their use-value. In the case where I 
compare properties that have direct access to a park versus properties that lie across the 
street and interacting parks with the featured amenities, I find a positive hedonic price for 
parks. Hence, suggesting that parks have positive use values. Positive use-value in parks 
may be linked to features like the type of park and recreational trails. On the other hand, 
negative use-values may be linked to features like athletic fields which back noise or light 
pollution. Given the mixed results, especially the negative valuation, I do not advocate for 
the elimination of parks. Instead, I argue that parks and park amenities can be managed 
efficiently to give the expected level of externalities and performances in today’s changing 
environment. All findings show a positive influence of local historic district on the 
residential markets, implying that positive environmental and economic benefits are 
associated with local historic districts. Due to the findings that local historic districts have 
an appreciated sales advantage over their immediate neighborhoods, I equate the result to 
a spillover effect. Still, I did not carry out an adequate analysis to imply a gentrification 
phenomenon.  
The essay on lead-risk that may exist in the water supply is unearthed in Chapter 3. 
The Flint, Michigan water crisis reverberated the lead contamination concerns in the United 
States. Most States face serious lead risks, as EPA disclosed that only nine States report 
safe levels of lead in their water supply. Identification of lead contamination, trusting the 
reporting systems, and financing the replacement of lead infrastructures are significant 
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problems in this area of water pollution. Prioritizing these problems, I focused on the 
discussion of identifying lead-risk in the residential water supply. Identifying the risk lead 
pollution in the water supply can be an unquestionable or a borderline case. Therefore, the 
essay presented in Chapter 3 asks two research questions: First, what is the willingness to 
pay to avoid lead exposure risk in a water supply system? Second, does information 
asymmetries among homeowners in the residential market occur relative to their water 
supplies? I evaluate the first question using a hedonic analysis. I assume that asymmetric 
information is present for high lead-risk water areas because full disclosure of potential 
lead risk in the water supply is not legitimately required during the sales of residential 
properties. The second question is examined by a deterministic model, using an average 
appreciation rate. Above all, potential lead risk in a water supply is important to discuss 
due to the connected health and financing implications. For example, 10% to 20% of lead 
intake in children are caused by water consumption, Rabin (2008). 
In Chapter 3, I do not find a statistical result to indicate that homeowners may be 
are willing to pay for homes to avoid water lead-risk. Holding all things constant, and 
considering only housing characteristics and median household income, I find that 
homeowners in the relatively low-lead risk water communities might implicitly value water 
more to avoid the likelihood of being poisoned by lead. I could not incorporate other 
variables because overlapping assumptions were violated. The cost of excluding controls 
cause bias in this average treatment result. When I compared the average appreciation rates 
of resale homes in the probable low and high-water risk areas, I find a higher average 
appreciation rate for homes in the high-risk neighborhoods. This finding might imply that 
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residents in the high-lead risk neighborhoods are uninformed and incapable of 
distinguishing the quality of high lead risks in the water. 
The discussions and conclusions inscribed in Chapter 2 and 3 recommend practical 
implications given the respective findings. Considering parks, I recommend that parks’ 
authorities intentionally use surveys to detect and mitigate the negative use-values and 
undesirable facilities. In terms of the historic districts, I call for the appropriate authorities 
covering historic districts to adopt communications and interventions against gentrification 
and to promote actions for integration. In the vein of lead risk in the water supply, I 
recommend that local authorities should structure a communication system to identify and 
disseminate the level of lead risk in water supplies. Also, these authorities should try to 
make the full-disclosure of water problem a legitimate requirement, in conjunction with 
the lead-paint full disclosure.  
Finally, I recognize the need for future study or post-thesis research to address these 
environmental issues, namely parks, historic districts, and water lead-risk. A future 
research needs to conduct a contingency valuation directed at the public, as well as to 
private homeowners who live in close proximity to parks, in order to capture the negative 
use-values of park amenities. This step would advise and facilitate financing, technical, 
and engineering solutions to address issues in parks. In Addition, I call for a study to 
develop a model to specifically investigate the gentrification phenomena which might be 
associated with historic districts. Most studies have found significant results in the local 
historic district. However, these studies are weak in explicitly modeling gentrification 
issues. Lastly, a future research needs to construct a data to account for buyers and sellers 
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informedness in the residential market through a stochastic approach in order to investigate 
asymmetric information relative to lead risk in water supplies. 
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